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Freedom of contract is significantly restricted in the market for professional 
services. Under the so-called “corporate practice doctrine,” professionals 
such as doctors and lawyers are prohibited from practicing within corporate 
entities, and laypeople are likewise prohibited from investing in professional 
service firms. Defenders of this prohibition argue that it can be justified as a 
means of protecting professional independence and thereby increasing the 
quality of care. In fact, however, the available evidence suggests that 
investment restrictions are counterproductive to their stated goal. In practice, 
these restrictions raise costs and reduce access without measurably improving 
the quality of service at all. 
This Article examines why, in spite of significant criticism, the doctrine 
remains alive in the twenty-first century in both medicine and law, preventing 
the professions from reaping the benefits of outside investment. Legislative 
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solutions have largely failed; U.S. jurisdictions universally prohibit corporate 
practice in the legal field, and a significant (and resurging) minority of states 
continues to apply corporate practice restrictions in medicine. In both fields, 
the possibility of reaching a political solution is hindered by protectionist 
impulses. 
This Article therefore proposes a challenge to the doctrine on constitutional 
grounds. The constitutional case in favor of private ordering is not an easy one 
to make: current constitutional doctrine defers heavily to state choices in the 
economic sphere, even when those choices lack any empirical evidence of 
rationality. Nevertheless, there has been an effort in recent years to move 
toward a more evidence-based version of rational basis review in economic 
cases. In addition, the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on commercial 
speech buttresses the case for permitting external investment. In a pair of 
recent decisions, the Court has demonstrated an increased focus on the 
public’s interest in obtaining free and unfettered information. The corporate 
practice doctrine therefore presents an excellent test case for a more robust 
review of professional regulation, whether under a rational basis standard or 
under a more heightened level of scrutiny. 
INTRODUCTION 
The corporate practice doctrine prohibits outside investment in professional 
services.1 It prevents nonlawyers from investing in the provision of legal 
services and likewise prevents nondoctors from investing in the provision of 
medical care.2 Prohibiting such investment protects the licensed professionals 
against outside competition. But does the prohibition also protect the clients 
and patients of those licensed professionals by raising the quality of 
professional advice?  
The quality argument rests on two fundamental assumptions: first, that 
outside investment reduces independence and therefore lowers the quality of 
professional advice; and second, that getting bad professional advice is worse 
than getting no professional advice at all. If either one of these assumptions 
proves false, then the quality-based rationale for banning outside investment 
crumbles, leaving only a protectionist rationale. Both assumptions have been 
heavily criticized by scholars, policymakers, and others,3 and few onlookers 
 
1 Grace M. Giesel, Corporations Practicing Law Through Lawyers: Why the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Doctrine Should Not Apply, 65 MO. L. REV. 151, 205 (2000). 
2 Id. at 204-05; George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access 
to Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s Shift to a 
Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 800 (2001) (“By denying to non-lawyers 
the opportunity to buy and resell the services of lawyers, granting to lawyers the exclusive 
right to earn a profit from investment in the legal services industry, and denying to non-
lawyers the opportunity to compete for management positions in for-profit law firms, the 
ownership restriction serves to ‘keep the law business all in the family.’”). 
3 See, e.g., Giesel, supra note 1, at 205 (“The Model Rules protect more directly against 
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have attempted to defend the corporate practice doctrine on either normative or 
pragmatic grounds.4  
 This Article examines why, in spite of such criticism, the doctrine still 
remains alive in the twenty-first century, preventing the professions from 
benefiting from outside investment, and why it is now more important than 
ever to allow private ordering in the market for professional services.5 In 
particular, this Article argues that current trends in technology, information 
availability, and globalization counter the existence of even a hypothetical 
benefit from the doctrine.6 This Article then turns to the question of how to 
eradicate the doctrine – an issue not easily solved, as the doctrine is embedded 
in competing statutory and common law sources, as well as in the ethical rules 
governing the legal profession.7 Economic protectionism, misguided 
 
the evils feared if corporations can practice law via attorneys than does the ‘hocus pocus’ of 
the corporate practice of law doctrine.”); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting 
Access to Justice Through the (Un)Corporate Practice of Law, INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333990 (“[A]s 
a matter of economic policy, it is essential that the legal profession abandon the prohibition 
on the corporate practice of law.”); Harris & Foran, supra note 2, at 800; Nicole Huberfeld, 
Be Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 
14 HEALTH MATRIX 243, 244 (2004) (“The corporate practice of medicine doctrine is a relic; 
a physician-centric guild doctrine that is at best misplaced, and at worst obstructive, in the 
present incarnation of the American health care system.”); Renee Newman Knake, 
Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (arguing that bar 
regulators disregard the potential benefit of corporate legal practice in the interests of lawyer 
independence, reputation, and client security, while also ignoring the other mechanisms that 
provide protection for those concerns).  
4 Two articles have defended corporate practice restrictions in law. See Paul R. Koppel, 
Under Siege from Within and Without: Why Model Rule 5.4 Is Vital to the Continued 
Existence of the American Legal Profession, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 687, 698 (2001) (“At 
heart, Model Rule 5.4 serves to protect clients from individuals not qualified or licensed to 
practice law. The practice of law is an extremely specialized vocation requiring 
particularized skills, professional ethics, and an independence of judgment. All these 
prerequisites are needed to ensure that clients receive the best legal representation 
possible.”); L. Harold Levinson, Independent Law Firms That Practice Law Only: Society’s 
Need, the Legal Profession’s Responsibility, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 262 (1990) (“We should 
be seriously concerned about the pending proposals by some lawyers and accountants in this 
country, and by the advocates of multidisciplinary practices in Europe, to dilute or even 
abandon professional independence.”). Another article recommends strengthening the 
restrictions in medicine as a means of reducing conflicts of interest between insurers and 
medical professionals. Andre Hampton, Resurrection of the Prohibition on the Corporate 
Practice of Medicine: Teaching Old Dogma New Tricks, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 489, 492 (1998) 
(arguing for the resurrection of the corporate practice doctrine in medicine). 
5 See infra Parts I & II. 
6 See infra Part III. 
7 See infra Part IV. 
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paternalism, and bureaucratic inertia all combine to resist easily abandoning 
the corporate practice doctrine. 
This Article therefore recommends cutting off the prohibition on outside 
investment at the root by launching a constitutional challenge founded on due 
process and freedom of contract.8 The constitutional case in favor of private 
ordering is not an easy one to make.9 Current constitutional doctrine defers 
heavily to state choices in the economic sphere, even when those choices lack 
any empirical evidence of rationality.10 Nonetheless, the pendulum may now 
be swinging back from its outer limit; commenters have urged courts to apply 
“a somewhat more vigorous version of rationality review in economic cases,” 
and there are signs that some are willing to do so, though such efforts remain 
controversial.11 Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on 
commercial speech may buttress the challenge to the prohibition on outside 
investment. In recent years, the Court has been increasingly willing to 
recognize the public’s interest in free and unfettered information.12 The 
corporate practice doctrine therefore presents an excellent test case for a more 
robust review, whether under a rational basis standard or under a more 
heightened level of scrutiny, that defers to legitimate economic choices but 
 
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 Judge Stephen Williams has persuasively argued that the structure of the Constitution 
“express[es] a preference for minimizing state interferences in private ordering,” and that a 
preference for private ordering can usefully play a “tie-breaker role” in statutory 
interpretation. Stephen F. Williams, Background Norms in the Regulatory State, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 419, 433-34 (1991) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: 
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990)). 
10 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (providing that 
deference to state legislative choice is appropriate whenever “there is an evil at hand for 
correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational 
way to correct it”); see also DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 2 (2011) (“The Supreme Court 
withdrew constitutional protection for liberty of contract in the 1930s. Since then, a hostile 
perspective inherited from the Progressives has virtually monopolized scholarly discussion 
of the Court’s liberty of contract decisions.”). 
11 Ernest A. Young, Sorrell v. IMS Health and the End of the Constitutional Double 
Standard, 36 VT. L. REV. 903, 928-29 (2012) (describing how others that have pressed for 
the more vigorous review, but expressing personal nervousness about reviving Lochner); see 
also BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 125 (“The Progressive outlook on constitutional law and 
related matters—a combination of support for the growth of an administrative state 
dominated by experts insulated from both politics and the market, opposition to serious 
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, and indifference or hostility to 
‘individualistic’ civil liberties and the rights of minorities—is now anachronistic and finds 
no comfortable ideological home in modern American politics.”); Timothy Sandefur, 
Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday’s Rationality Review Isn’t 
Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 457, 458 (2004). 
12 See infra Part IV.B. 
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does not blindly give way to policies designed to “protect[] insiders against 
competition.”13 
 I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE DOCTRINE 
The corporate practice doctrine is a pure restriction on the right to contract: 
it prohibits professionals from contracting for employment with entities 
organized to serve third parties, and prohibits nonprofessionals from 
contracting to provide capital in professional service firms.14 The doctrine took 
root in the early part of the twentieth century, at a time when both the legal and 
medical professions were struggling to distinguish themselves from the “spirit 
of trade,”15 and desired to reduce competition among members of the 
profession.16 Occupational licensing became widespread between 1890 and 
1910.17 With a licensing scheme firmly in place, states then applied the 
corporate practice doctrine primarily in medicine and law: doctors, dentists, 
veterinarians, and lawyers have all been subject to the doctrine, and therefore 
forbidden to practice in corporations with outside ownership or with partners 
who were not also members of the same profession.18 
The corporate practice doctrine rests on two primary grounds. The first is 
pure economic protectionism: avoiding competition and keeping economic 
returns for professionals alone.19 The second ground is oriented, at least in 
 
13 Sandefur, supra note 11, at 487. 
14 Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 45) (“The doctrine . . . prohibits lawyers from 
being employed by entities that provide legal services to others: this is a restriction on the 
form of contract that a lawyer can enter into with others.”). 
15 Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 898 (1979) (quoting an unnamed 1890 report to the 
AMA House of Delegates); see also Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The Corporate Practice 
of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. 
REV. 445, 461 (1987) (“In 1934 the House of Delegates added another ethical provision 
bearing on contract practice. Entitled ‘Direct Profits to Lay Groups,’ the provision 
condemned arrangements in which a lay entity directly profited from compensation received 
by a physician for providing medical services.”). 
16 See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 15, at 455 (“A substantial segment of the medical 
profession harbored hostility toward forms of organizing medical practices and methods of 
paying for medical services that increased competition among independent physicians.”); 
Heather A. Miller, Note, Don’t Just Check “Yes” or “No”: The Need for Broader 
Consideration of Outside Investment in the Law, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 312 (2010). 
17 Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: 
A Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 489 (1965) (“Laws to license doctors, 
plumbers, barbers, funeral directors, nurses, electricians, horseshoers, dentists, and the 
practitioners of many other occupations were debated, propounded and very often passed.”). 
18 See, e.g., Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins., 703 N.W.2d 513, 522 (Minn. 
2005) (“[H]istorically the prohibition on corporate practice applies to the ‘learned 
professions’ and is not limited to medicine.”). 
19 Opposition to corporate practice arose in part because doctors “wanted to prevent the 
emergence of any intermediary or third party that might keep for itself the profits potentially 
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theory, toward client protection: defending professionals’ independent 
judgment from outside pressure, and thereby protecting clients and patients 
from the risk of harmful legal or medical advice.20 This Part explores how 
those competing goals gave rise to the doctrine and how the doctrine 
subsequently evolved over time in medicine and law. 
A. Medicine 
The corporate practice doctrine is in some ways a historical anachronism in 
the medical field – but it is nonetheless surprisingly resilient.21 The doctrine 
arose in the states as part of a broader attempt to regulate professional 
services.22 In 1934 the American Medical Association (AMA) added an ethical 
rule declaring it “unprofessional” for doctors to contract for salaried 
employment.23 The AMA declared that such practice “is beneath the dignity of 
professional practice, is unfair competition with the profession at large, is 
harmful alike to the profession of medicine and the welfare of the people, and 
is against sound public policy.”24 
The corporate practice doctrine gained legitimacy after it survived a 
constitutional challenge in the 1930s. The case challenging the doctrine arose 
when a dentist’s license was revoked by the State of Colorado for accepting 
employment with a corporate dental practice.25 The dentist appealed the 
 
available in the practice of medicine. . . . [T]he full return on physicians’ labor had to go to 
physicians.” PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 215-16 
(1982)); see also Chase-Lubitz, supra note 15, at 455 (describing the medical profession’s 
hostility towards not only corporate practice, but also contract practice, clinics, and group 
practice). 
20 E.g., Cal. Med. Ass’n, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 194, 199 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the doctrine was “adopted to protect the professional 
independence of physicians and to avoid the divided loyalty inherent in the relationship of a 
physician employee to a lay employer”). 
21 Andrew Fichter, Owning a Piece of the Doc: State Law Restraints on Lay Ownership 
of Healthcare Enterprises, 39 J. HEALTH L. 1, 7 (2006) (“[T]he corporate practice doctrine 
and related impediments to lay ownership have proven remarkably resilient.”). 
22 See Friedman, supra note 17, at 489 (stating that professional regulation became 
widespread between 1890 and 1910). 
23 Am. Med. Ass’n., 94 F.T.C. 701, 899 (1979) (“It is unprofessional for a physician to 
dispose of his professional attainments or services to any lay body, organization, group or 
individual, by whatever name called, or however organized, under terms or conditions 
which permit a direct profit from the fees, salary or compensation received to accrue to the 
lay body or individual employing him.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medical 
Ethics and New Methods of Practice, 103 JAMA 263, 263-64 (1934))). 
24 Id. 
25 State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Miller, 8 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Colo. 1932), appeal 
denied, Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Colo., 287 U.S. 563 (1932) (holding that 
revoking a dentist’s license for accepting employment in a corporate practice was not an 
abuse of discretion and was supported by the evidence). 
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revocation on due process grounds, but the Supreme Court disagreed that the 
doctrine raised a constitutional issue and therefore denied the appeal.26 Three 
years later, the Court stated explicitly that states could reasonably prohibit 
professionals from accepting employment in corporate practices.27 Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the Court’s decision to uphold the corporate practice doctrine 
went along with upholding prohibitions on advertising for professional 
services,28 and it occurred just as the Court was more generally abandoning the 
liberty of contract doctrine.29 
Over the next eight decades, the corporate practice doctrine weakened in the 
medical field. In 1979, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) launched an 
antitrust challenge to the AMA’s ethical rule against corporate practice.30 The 
FTC ordered the association “to cease and desist from promulgating, 
implementing and enforcing restraints on advertising, solicitation and contract 
practices by physicians and on the contractual arrangements between 
physicians and non-physicians,” though it made an exception to allow the 
restraint of “false or deceptive” activities.31 The order was appealed; 
ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed 
that the provision was an unlawful restraint of trade, and it upheld a modified 
version of the order, requiring the Association to refrain from “interfering with 
the consideration offered or provided to any physician in any contract with any 
entity that offers physicians’ services to the public.”32 The Second Circuit’s 
judgment was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court in 1982.33 
The elimination of the AMA’s previous restriction did not mean the end of 
the corporate practice doctrine in medicine, though it may have looked that 
way in the early 1980s.34 Nevertheless, a number of states still independently 
prohibited physicians from contracting for employment with for-profit 
 
26 Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Colo., 287 U.S. 563 (1932) (denying appeal 
for want of a federal question). 
27 Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935) (“We have held 
that the State may deny to corporations the right to practice, insisting upon the personal 
obligations of individuals . . . .”) (citing Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 8 P.2d 699, 
appeal denied, Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Colo., 287 U.S. 563). 
28 Semler, 294 U.S. at 611-12 (“We do not doubt the authority of the State to estimate the 
baleful effects of such [advertising] methods and to put a stop to them.”). 
29 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 108 (“[T]he Court’s abandonment of the liberty of 
contract doctrine b[egan] in the mid-1930s.”). 
30 Am. Med. Ass’n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 453 (excepting from the provision “professional peer review of fee practices of 
physicians”).  
33 Am. Med. Ass’n v. FTC, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). 
34 Arnold J. Rosoff, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Has Its Time 
Passed?, 12 HEALTH L. DIG. 1, 3-4 (Supp. Dec. 1984) (calling corporate practice restrictions 
“‘legal landmines,’ remnants of an old and nearly forgotten war, half-buried on a field fast 
being built up with new forms of health care organizations”). 
  
186 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:179 
 
corporations.35 Because these rules were adopted by state legislatures, they 
were exempt from antitrust challenges under the state action doctrine.36 Some 
state laws were preempted by federal legislation authorizing health 
management organizations (HMOs).37 Other state laws remained on the books, 
though largely ignored and unenforced for a number of years.38 Nevertheless, a 
significant minority of states continued actively enforcing corporate practice 
restrictions,39 and, in recent years, some states have begun dusting off long-
ignored common law restrictions on corporate practice.40 In addition, the 
 
35 Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins., 703 N.W.2d 513, 522 (Minn. 2005); D. 
Cameron Dobbins, Survey of State Laws Relating to the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 9 
HEALTH LAW. 18, 18 (1996). 
36 Cal. Ass’n of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle Vision Ctr., Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting Pearle Vision Center’s antitrust challenge to California’s 
corporate practice restriction, as the regulations “are activities required by the state acting in 
its sovereign capacity,” and therefore “beyond the reach of the Sherman Anti-Trust Laws”). 
37 Sabra K. Engelbrecht, Comment, The Importance of Clarifying North Carolina’s 
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1093, 1102-03 (1998) 
(“Although the 1973 legislation did not explicitly preempt state corporate practice of 
medicine prohibitions, 1988 amendments to the HMO Act preempted all state laws that 
impose requirements that inhibit the formation of HMOs. . . . Accordingly, almost all of the 
states have exempted HMOs from the prohibition against the corporate practice of 
medicine.” (footnotes omitted)). 
38 Edward B. Hirshfeld & Gail H. Thomason, Medical Necessity Determinations: The 
Need for a New Legal Structure, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 47 (1996) (“While the majority of 
states retain a bar on the corporate practice of medicine, corporate interests have managed to 
either find a way around, through, or ignored the intent behind the corporate bar.” (footnote 
omitted)); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1165, 1166 n.2 (2012) (“By the end of the century, most states were 
ignoring the laws, had repealed them, or had enacted laws enabling managed care plans to 
structure themselves as corporations. The advent of large private and governmental health 
insurance programs and their attempts to rein in costs ultimately defeated efforts by 
organized medicine to resist external controls over physician behavior.” (citations omitted)).  
39 One recent study found that ten states actively enforced a prohibition on doctors from 
accepting direct employment with for-profit hospitals as of 2012; four of those ten states 
also restricted employment by nonprofit hospitals. Eric Lammers, The Effect of Hospital-
Physician Integration on Health Information Technology Adoption, 22 HEALTH ECON. 1215, 
1218 (2013) (showing that Arkansas, California, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, 
South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia are the states that limit employment 
with hospitals in some manner). 
40 Isles Wellness, 703 N.W.2d at 524 (reaffirming a 1933 case, Granger v. Adson, 250 
N.W. 722 (Minn. 1933), adopting a common law prohibition on the corporate practice of 
medicine); Huberfeld, supra note 3, at 253 (“While the doctrine may seem too outdated to 
be enforced, the statutes and regulations that form the doctrine remain in current statutory 
compilations and, like a sleeping dragon, need only a slight stimulus to be set into action.”). 
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passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act reignited the 
discussion of corporate practice restrictions.41 
B. Law 
The corporate practice doctrine has remained much more robust in law than 
in medicine. The legal profession originally followed a similar path as the 
medical profession, by first introducing licensing rules and then by restricting 
licensed professionals’ ability to contract for employment with corporate 
entities. The American Bar Association (ABA), like the AMA, was 
instrumental in adding corporate practice restrictions to the ethics rules: the 
ABA adopted supplemental ethical rules against nonlawyer investment in law 
firms in 1928,42 very close to the time that the AMA adopted its parallel rules 
for doctors.43 These supplemental ethics canons provided that the “professional 
services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency, 
personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer” and further 
specified that a lawyer who works in-house with a business or organization 
“should not include the rendering of legal services to the members of such an 
organization in respect to their individual affairs.”44 The supplemental canons 
even prohibited attorneys from serving as advice columnists for newspapers, 
specifically stating that while a “lawyer may with propriety write articles for 
publications in which he gives information upon the law,” that attorney 
“should not accept employment from such publications to advise inquirers in 
respect to their individual rights.”45 
 
41 See Craig A. Conway, Accountable Care Organizations Versus Texas’ Corporate 
Practice of Medicine Doctrine, HEALTH L. PERSP. 3-5 (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.law.uh. 
edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2010/%28CC%29%20ACO.pdf (observing that the Act’s 
establishment of “Accountable Care Organizations” would likely conflict with Texas’s 
statutory prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine, and suggesting that the state 
statute be amended to accommodate the new practice form (but cautioning that physicians 
may be unwilling to accept the lower billing rates and heightened control offered by such 
organizations)). 
42 Report, Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Professional Ethics, 51 
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 495, 497 (1928) (“The professional services of a lawyer should not be 
controlled or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between 
client and lawyer.”); Striking and Successful Celebration of Association’s Semi-Centennial, 
14 A.B.A. J. 447, 479-80 (1928) (observing that the proposals were officially adopted in at 
the ABA annual meeting in 1928); Bernard Sharfman, Note, Modifying Model Rule 5.4 to 
Allow for Minority Ownership of Law Firms by Nonlawyers, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477, 
480 (2000). 
43 Medical Ethics and New Methods of Practice, 103 JAMA 263, 263-64 (1934). 
44 Report, supra note 42, at 497 (“The professional services of a lawyer should not be 
controlled or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between 
client and lawyer.”). 
45 Id. 
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These restrictions on attorney employment paralleled the restrictions on 
physician employment.46 Unlike the AMA, however, the ABA did not regulate 
lawyers’ conduct directly; instead, the highest court of each state was charged 
with adopting ethical rules to govern the practice of law, though in actual 
practice those rules tended to largely mirror the ABA’s model.47 The 
difference in adoption procedures meant that the state action exception to 
antitrust liability played a more robust role. The FTC did challenge certain 
ABA restrictions, including an overbroad definition of the “practice of law.”48 
Such challenges were ultimately left to the individual states, however, and 
there was no effective analog in the legal profession to the FTC’s challenge to 
the AMA rule – although the FTC did urge states to drop the corporate practice 
restrictions, it had no power to compel that action.49 As a result, while the 
AMA dropped its ethical restriction on corporate practice after losing the 
FTC’s 1979 lawsuit, the ABA did not drop its rule; in fact, its restriction on 
nonlawyer investment remains part of the current ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.50 
 
46 See supra Part I.A. 
47 Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the 
Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 620-21 (1989) (“The state action 
exemption has been held to shelter lawyer rules of professional conduct when they have 
been adopted by a state supreme court. Thus, state court action adopting Rule 5.4, or its 
predecessors under the older Code, would be immune from prosecution or private action 
under the antitrust laws.” (footnote omitted)); James Wilber, Ready or Not, Here They 
Come, LEGAL MGMT., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 16, 16 (“Most states now have rules of 
professional conduct that closely mirror the ABA’s model rules . . . .”). 
48 Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of 
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1707-08 
(2008) (“After being told by the FTC, the Department of Justice, and its own section on 
Antitrust Law that the definition was too broad, the task force recommended and the ABA 
adopted a resolution that allowed an arguably broader definition but left the matter to the 
profession in each state.” (footnote omitted)). 
49 Andrews, supra note 47, at 620 (“[W]hile the existing rules governing the relations 
between lawyers and nonlawyers are incompatible with federal antitrust policy, they have 
escaped enforcement because of the state action defense.”); Harris & Foran, supra note 2, at 
800 (observing that the FTC urged the Supreme Court of Kentucky not to adopt a rule 
against outside investment, as it would “prevent the use of potentially efficient business 
formats” and otherwise “limit potentially procompetitive professional ventures” (citing 
Letter from Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, Dir., FTC Bureau of Competition, to Robert F. Stephen, 
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Ky. 5-6 (June 8, 1987))). 
50 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(d) (2010) (forbidding a lawyer from 
“practic[ing] with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to 
practice law for a profit,” if, among other things, “a nonlawyer owns any interest therein”); 
id. cmt. 2 (stating that the rule “expresses traditional limitations on permitting a third party 
to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering legal services to 
another”). 
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The states have likewise been reluctant to abandon the corporate practice 
doctrine for legal services. In 1981, an ABA commission (chaired by attorney 
Robert Kutak, and formed for the purpose of recommending revisions to the 
Model Rules) returned a recommendation in favor of allowing nonlawyer 
investment in legal services, as long as other requisites of independence and 
confidentiality were maintained.51 The proposal died after opponents pointed 
out that “the proposed rule would open up the legal profession to ownership by 
large retail institutions such as Sears or the large accounting firms, creating 
competition with traditional law firms”; afterward, these objections to 
nonlawyer investment became known as the “Fear of Sears,” and were 
influential in defeating the proposal.52 
Although states need not follow the ABA Model Rules, there have been few 
state initiatives to change the rules on nonlawyer investment. The District of 
Columbia has the most generous investment provision of any U.S. jurisdiction; 
it allows “an individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which 
assist the organization in providing legal services to clients” to become a 
partner in a firm that “has as its sole purpose providing legal services to 
clients” as long as the nonlawyer participant(s) “undertake to abide by these 
Rules of Professional Conduct.”53 This limited exception would allow an 
accountant to become a partner at a tax law firm; it would not, however, allow 
Sears or WalMart to hire attorneys to provide legal services to store customers, 
and it would not allow the passive contribution of capital from outside 
investors.54 In 2011, both the ABA and the State of New York examined 
proposals to adopt limited rules similar to the D.C. rule;55 due to opposition 
from the bar, however, both proposals went down in defeat.56 
 
51 Sharfman, supra note 42, at 481 (“The Commission’s 1981 draft of Model Rule 5.4 
recommended that investment by nonlawyers be permitted so long as there was no 
interference with the lawyer’s professional independent judgment and attorney-client 
relationship, the rule on confidentiality of information was retained, the rules on solicitation 
were not violated, and the fees charged were reasonable.”). 
52 Id. at 481; see also Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big 
Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) 
(“For nearly seventy years, the profession’s Fear of Sears has doomed any proposal that 
would have allowed a nonlawyer even a passive investment in a law firm.”). 
53 D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2007). 
54 Id. cmt. 8. 
55 Tyler Cobb, Note, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too! Appropriately Harnessing the 
Advantages of Nonlawyer Ownership, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 765, 787 (2012). 
56 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON NONLAWYER OWNERSHIP 50-
54 (2012); Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2) (observing that the ABA 20/20 proposal 
“was killed by the Commission four months after the circulation of a discussion draft, never 
making it to the floor of the House of Delegates,” and the New York State Bar “released a 
report explaining their opposition to the proposal”); Press Release, ABA Comm’n on Ethics 
20/20, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will Not Propose Changes to ABA Policy 
Prohibiting Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.americanbar. 
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In spite of the fact that the ABA and the states have been reluctant to change 
the investment rules, they may well find change foisted upon them. Other 
countries – most notably Australia and England – have liberalized their 
investment rules and allowed outside investment.57 As discussed more in Part 
III, U.S. jurisdictions are facing significant competitive pressure on the 
international front from jurisdictions that have already liberalized restrictions 
on professional practice.58 
In addition to pressure from these international sources, domestic legal 
service providers (though still a minority of the practicing bar)59 are also 
pressing for change, and new lawsuits are challenging the investment 
restrictions. An earlier constitutional challenge to the rules against outside 
investment was rejected by the Seventh Circuit in 1992.60 Now, however, the 
challenges are revitalized. The law firm of Jacoby and Meyers, LLP has been 
at the vanguard of the new challenges to the corporate practice doctrine within 
the United States; it has sued in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, 
arguing that the ban on investment violates the firm’s constitutional rights.61 
These suits are still in their infancy, with the underlying substantive legal 
arguments yet to be fleshed out.62 Nevertheless, the suits may well have 
traction; after a federal district court in New York originally dismissed the 
 
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120416_news_release_re_nonlawyer_o
wnership_law_firms.authcheckdam.pdf. 
57 See infra Part III.B. 
58 Daniel Vázquez Albert, Competition Law and Professional Practice, 11 ILSA J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 555, 617-18 (2005) (“This circumstance has turned the countries with flexible 
regulations into exporters of professional services and those with rigorous regulations into 
importers of such services.”); Justin D. Petzold, Comment, Firm Offers: Are Publicly 
Traded Law Firms Abroad Indicative of the Future of the United States Legal Sector?, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 67, 101 (“Motivation for reform via competitive pressure in the United States 
must emerge via an international front.”). 
59 Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 3-4) (commenting that state bars 
overwhelmingly supported maintaining corporate practice restrictions). 
60 Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1385 (7th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the 
rule against outside investment satisfied rational basis review because it is “designed to 
safeguard the public, maintain the integrity of the profession, and protect the administration 
of justice from reproach”). 
61 Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Jacoby & Meyers, 
LLP v. Presiding Justices of First, Second, Third & Fourth Departments, Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, No. CV-11-3387 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 2011 
WL 7102185 (“Rule 5.4 substantially burdens the fundamental right of legal service 
providers to associate with others and to represent clients for purposes of accessing the 
courts and asserting legal entitlements. There are no compelling or rational grounds for 
preventing lawyers from raising capital in the same manner as any other business; and there 
are alternative regulatory means to achieve any putative legitimate state purposes that Rule 
5.4 otherwise seeks to advance.”); Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 18). 
62 Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 18) (stating that the New Jersey and Connecticut 
courts have yet to rule on the merits). 
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New York case for lack of standing, the Second Circuit reinstated the case and 
remanded for consideration on the merits.63 
C. The Continuing Challenge of Corporate Practice Restrictions in Medicine 
and Law 
As discussed previously, the corporate practice doctrine has eroded more 
quickly in medicine than in law. In some states, corporate practice restrictions 
have been eliminated from the medical field entirely – a situation still unheard 
of in the legal field.64 And even in states that continue to restrict the corporate 
practice of medicine, significant loopholes to the doctrine allow greater 
participation by organizations – in many states, for example, hospitals and their 
affiliates are allowed to employ physicians.65 Other states will allow a broader 
range of business entities to employ physicians, as long as “the company does 
not exercise control over the physician’s independent medical judgment.”66 
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to say that the doctrine is necessarily on the 
way out in medicine; while some states have continued to loosen restrictions, 
others have reaffirmed or tightened existing restrictions.67 
 
63 Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of First, Second, Third & Fourth 
Departments, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, 488 F. 
App’x 526, 527 (2d Cir. 2012) (remanding to allow Jacoby & Meyers, LLP to amend its 
complaint to challenge additional New York state laws so that the District Court could 
adequately address the constitutionality of those laws and Rule 5.4). 
64 Lofft et al., Is a Hybrid Just What the Doctor Ordered? Evaluating the Potential Use 
of Alternative Company Structures by Healthcare Enterprises, HEALTH LAW., Apr. 2013, at 
9, 13 (“Some states have not historically prohibited CPOM, and a few have not provided 
meaningful guidance as to whether CPOM is prohibited (and whether any exceptions 
apply).” (footnote omitted)); see also 1992 Va. Op. Att’y Gen. 147, 150 (1992) (“[T]here is 
no court decision or statute in Virginia adopting the ‘corporate practice of medicine’ 
doctrine.”); Health Care Alert: State Medical Board of Ohio Declares that Ohio Law Does 
Not Prohibit the Corporate Practice of Medicine, VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR & PEASE LLP 
(Apr. 4, 2012), www.vorys.com/publications-589.html (“Ohio law does not prohibit an Ohio 
licensed physician from rendering medical services as an employee of a corporation or any 
other form of business entity.”). 
65 Lofft et al., supra note 64, at 13. 
66 Id. at 13 n.20 (citing 2001 Ala. Op. Att’y Gen. 89; Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 91-7-1 
(1991)). 
67 Id. at 13 (“A small number of states have in recent years reaffirmed their commitment 
to the CPOM doctrine.”); see also Estate of Harper ex rel. Al-Hamim v. Denver Health & 
Hosp. Auth., 140 P.3d 273, 276 (Colo. App. 2006) (acknowledging that the Colorado 
legislature took action “to reinstate the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to the extent 
[a 2002 court decision] had created an exception to it”); Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive 
N. Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 513, 524 (Minn. 2005) (reaffirming restrictions on the corporate 
practice of medicine). 
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Thus, although state laws vary significantly, industry advisors point to four 
areas in which the corporate practice doctrine continues to exert influence over 
the medical profession: 
1. Some states prohibit business entities from employing physicians to 
provide medical care. 
2. Certain states require entities that provide medical services be owned 
and operated by licensed medical doctors. 
3. Some states prohibit professional fee splitting between licensed 
medical professionals and non-licensed individuals or business entities. 
4. The management fees stated within management services agreements 
must be set at fair market value.68 
By and large, these restrictions are the same as the prohibitions on lawyers’ 
practice found in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.69 The first 
three restrictions are explicitly forbidden,70 and the fourth is normally 
inapplicable only because law firms, unlike medical providers, rarely hire 
outside administrators – though parallel restrictions on marking up fees for 
nonlegal services would almost certainly require firms to limit such fees to fair 
market value if they did hire such administrators.71 
Thus, the types of restrictions imposed by the corporate practice doctrine are 
strikingly similar in both law and medicine. The main difference is that these 
restrictions are more universal in law than in medicine. States have enacted a 
patchwork of exceptions and loopholes in the corporate practice of medicine, 
so that while each of these restrictions continues to carry force in some states, 
the doctrine does not operate consistently – in the field of medicine, different 
states impose different restrictions to different degrees. In law, however, the 
states are nearly uniform, with only the District of Columbia having allowed 
minor inroads into outside investment.72 Nevertheless, because the doctrine 
operates similarly across the two professions, it is useful to consider the 
 
68 Jennifer Brunkow, 3 Steps to Navigate Through the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-
regulatory-issues/3-steps-to-navigate-through-the-corporate-practice-of-medicine.html. 
69 See supra Part I.B. 
70 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983). 
71 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379 (1993) 
(finding that attorneys are limited to charging “reasonable fees” for administrative services 
and that unless the client has agreed otherwise, “it is impermissible for a lawyer to create an 
additional source of profit for the law firm beyond that which is contained in the provision 
of professional services themselves”); Douglas R. Richmond, The Business and Ethics of 
Liability Insurers’ Efforts to Manage Legal Care, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 57, 68 (1997) (“As a 
general rule, attorneys should bear overhead costs rather than shifting them to their 
clients.”). 
72 See supra notes 53-56. 
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professions together when examining the role of corporate practice restrictions 
in the modern era. 
 II. THE CORPORATE PRACTICE DOCTRINE’S REGULATORY DISTORTION 
Regulation is intended to counteract market failure.73 Thus, economic 
regulation may be aimed at removing monopoly rents when competition is 
absent from the marketplace.74 Regulation of professional services, by contrast, 
is intended – at least in theory75 – to compensate for market failure arising 
from consumers’ inability to monitor professional quality: if laypeople cannot 
competently evaluate the quality of professional service providers they hire,76 
then regulation may protect the public from suffering harm they could not have 
reasonably avoided.77 
But while regulation at its best can correct for market failure, at its worst it 
can also induce the very market failure that it was intended to counteract.78 
Such regulatory distortion can occur when individuals capture the regulatory 
system and introduce anticompetitive rules for their own benefit.79 Regulatory 
 
73 Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing out the Bathwater: Justice 
Breyer’s Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 721, 725 (1995) (“According to 
economic theory, the purpose of regulation is to address market failures and thereby 
increase the efficiency of markets.” (citing STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 
(1982))). 
74 See James Alleman & Paul Rapport, Optimal Pricing with Sunk Cost and Uncertainty, 
in THE ECONOMICS OF ONLINE MARKETS AND ICT NETWORKS 143, 146 (Russel Cooper et al. 
eds., 2006). 
75 In practice, licensing laws have often served to extract monopoly rents. David E. 
Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use of Government Regulatory 
Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 90 (1994); Thomas G. Moore, 
The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93, 93 (1961). 
76 Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality 
Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328, 1329 (1979) (“It is difficult, for example, for a patient to 
ascertain the exact quality of a physician’s services or for a housewife (or househusband) to 
verify the radiation leakage of a microwave oven.”); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big 
Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 806 (commenting that licensing schemes “assume a need to 
screen unqualified lawyers in order to prevent the development of a ‘lemons’ market in 
which consumers do not know whom to trust and therefore distrust lawyers generally”). 
77 Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 207 (Colo. 2006) (“The primary purpose of lawyer 
regulation proceedings is to protect the public, not to punish an offending lawyer.”); Bird v. 
Mo. Bd. of Architects, Prof’l Eng’rs, Prof’l Land Surveyors & Landscape Architects, 259 
S.W.3d 516, 523 (Mo. 2008) (“While some financial protection of licensees may be an 
effect of professional regulation, the public’s protection—not the licensees’—is the purpose 
of professional regulation.”). 
78 BREYER, supra note 73, at 194-95 (commenting that “classical regulation can cause 
various sorts of anticompetitive harm,” including raising barriers to entry, raising prices, and 
protecting inefficient firms). 
79 Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should 
Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 
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distortion can also occur even with the best of intentions if regulators 
misunderstand the relevant facts and circumstances underlying the regulated 
system.80 In such cases, regulators may misdiagnose the market failure they 
seek to correct, or they may correctly diagnose the problem but apply the 
wrong set of tools to fix the problem.81 
The corporate practice doctrine creates all three types of regulatory 
distortion. On the legal side, there is no question that attorney self-regulation 
gives rise to some amount of self-interested rulemaking – and that, in 
particular, one of the motivations for preserving corporate practice restrictions 
was to protect against competition.82 Likewise, physicians have rallied in favor 
of the corporate practice doctrine in medicine.83 But the larger regulatory 
distortions are the ones that are unintentional: Even if the doctrine were 
adopted with the best of intentions for public protection, it would still reduce 
access to medical and legal services without correspondingly increasing the 
quality of professional care. 
There is significant evidence that corporate practice restrictions reduce 
access to professional services.84 This reduction is not surprising; prohibiting 
outside investment in professional services denies professional service 
providers the resources they need in order to find and serve their clientele.85 
This effect is especially pronounced at the lower end of the market, where 
outside investment could create economies of scale that would bring the cost of 
professional services down to a level where more people could afford to enter 
the market.86 
 
1180 (2003) (“In general, small, concentrated groups with a lot at stake per capita regularly 
triumph over diffuse, large groups with little individual stake, even though the aggregate 
cost to the large group is considerable and often greater than the gain to the small group.”). 
80 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 4-35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 530 (1945) 
(discussing the economist’s error “to assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind 
in the same manner in which we assume it to be given to us as the explaining economist”). 
81 BREYER, supra note 73, at 194 (discussing the importance of identifying “areas where 
the wrong regulatory tools are likely being used”). 
82 See Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 3) (explaining how a New York proposal to 
allow nonlawyer ownership of law firms failed after a survey of state lawyers encountered 
seventy-eight percent opposition). 
83 ALLEGRA KIM, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 
DOCTRINE 1 (2007) (“With the aid of state legislatures and the courts, physicians seeking to 
promote and protect their profession and autonomy succeeded in prohibiting the CPM.”). 
84 See Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 1-2); Harris & Foran, supra note 2, at 800 
(“The legal services regulatory scheme and its various prohibitions thus play a prominent 
role in ensuring that the price of participation in the legal services market remains too high 
for most Americans.”). 
85 Hadfield, supra note 48, at 1723 (“Professional regulation of legal markets 
significantly restricts the capacity for scaling up new legal ideas by limiting the potential to 
exploit economies of scale and scope.”). 
86 Id.; Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 5) (“The problem is not financing options 
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The corporate form itself is valuable precisely for its ability to offer a choice 
of raising capital either through debt financing or by offering ownership 
shares.87 Like other entrepreneurs and innovators, professional service 
providers need sufficient capital to be able to reach potential clients in need of 
their services. And in fact, professional service providers may need more 
capital than traditional businesses. There is no reason to believe that attorneys 
and physicians are usually good – or even mediocre – businesspeople; these 
are very different skill sets, and, as others have pointed out, “an inventive mind 
is rarely accompanied by the skill necessary to transform a novel thought into 
the tangible invention and produce it for the market.”88 Lawyers and doctors 
have dedicated years of education to develop a very specialized expertise. Only 
in rare instances, however, does their expertise encompass either marketing 
skill or administrative ability. Capital – including economic, intellectual, and 
social capital – is needed to bridge the gap between these professional service 
providers and their markets.89 
The inefficiencies created by the corporate practice doctrine can be easily 
seen in the current market for legal services. The market currently contains 
large numbers of unemployed attorneys willing to work for low pay90 
coexisting with a large population of individuals who need, but cannot afford, 
legal services.91 In an efficient market, the attorneys looking for work would 
be hired by those who have unmet legal needs. Differences in price 
requirements (what the client would be willing to pay, and what the attorney 
would be willing to accept) are not the primary driver of inefficiency; in spite 
of the fact that attorneys have been applying in droves for unpaid internships 
and low-paying positions,92 a typical client cannot find an attorney willing to 
 
available to existing law firms, which do indeed seem to be surviving just fine without 
equity participation by nonlawyers.”). 
87 Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Selecting a Business Entity for a Small Business: Non-Tax 
Considerations, 93 DICK. L. REV. 519, 539 (1989). 
88 Jones v. Ulrich, 95 N.E.2d 113, 118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950). 
89 Cassandra Burke Robertson, A Collaborative Model of Offshore Legal Outsourcing, 
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 125, 149 (2011) (describing four forms of capital – economic, intellectual, 
social, and symbolic – and observing that intellectual capital includes “specialized 
knowledge and competence in the field,” and social capital includes “access to stakeholders 
and decisionmakers”). 
90 For example, a Boston firm offering $10,000 a year for a full-time attorney received 
thirty-two applications for the job. Martha Neil, Boston Law Firm Got 32 Applicants for 
Attorney Job Paying $10,000 a Year, Partner Says, A.B.A. J. (May 31, 2012, 4:35 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/boston_law_firm_got_32_applicants_for_attorney_
job_paying_10000_a_year_part.  
91 Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 10) (“Conventional legal services are simply 
beyond the means of most Americans.”); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook 
Disruption: How Social Media May Transform Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to 
Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75, 84 (2012). 
92 Alana Semuels, Unpaid Internships Gain Popularity Among the Jobless, L.A. TIMES 
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accept less than $150 an hour – a rate that is flatly unaffordable even for most 
middle class individuals.93 
Instead, the mismatch appears to arise from difficulties in maintaining 
overhead, finding and reaching the potential client base, and adopting an 
economy of scale sufficient to sustain the legal work – all things that are made 
more difficult under the current regulatory regime.94 Thus, a single attorney 
who “hangs a shingle” may have a difficult time making a living.95 The 
attorney may not know how to market his or her services or how best to reach 
those who might have unmet legal needs. Even if the attorney finds a paying 
client or two, it is unlikely that the attorney has sufficient cash reserves to 
cover the downtime between clients. The attorney, like any other entrepreneur, 
needs sufficient capital to be able to reach potential clients in need of legal 
services. Having sufficient capital also provides benefits to the clients – thus, 
for example, many solo practitioners cannot afford malpractice insurance and 
are largely judgment proof as individuals, creating a risk for clients.96 
Allowing corporate entities to provide legal services largely eliminates that 
risk, as such entities would have sufficient capital either to purchase insurance 
or to self-insure.97 
 
(Mar. 14, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/14/business/la-fi-old-interns-2011031 
5; Liza Dee & Cory Weinberg, In Dim Job Market, Law School Pays More Graduates to 
Work, GW HATCHET (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.gwhatchet.com/2013/02/07/in-dim-job-
market-law-school-pays-more-graduates-to-work. 
93 Robertson, supra note 91, at 79 (explaining that most parties without legal 
representation in civil actions do not qualify for legal aid and “often cannot afford the cost 
of an attorney, which would likely run $150 per hour or more”); Debra Cassens Weiss, 
Middle-Class Dilemma: Can’t Afford Lawyers, Can’t Qualify for Legal Aid, A.B.A. J. (July 
22, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/middle-class_dilemma_cant_ 
afford_lawyers_cant_qualify_for_legal_aid. 
94 Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the 
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 154 (2010) 
(“[T]he extreme approach to unauthorized practice of law in the United States drastically 
curtails the potential for ordinary folks to obtain assistance with their law-related needs and 
problems.”). 
95 See, e.g., Jack A. Guttenberg, Practicing Law in the Twenty-First Century in a 
Twentieth (Nineteenth) Century Straightjacket: Something Has to Give, 2012 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 415, 482-83 (acknowledging that “solo and small firm lawyers” who lack the capital to 
adjust to the changing legal market may be harmed by competition from corporate 
competitors, but that “nonlawyer-corporate ownership will bring needed capital and 
incentives to develop alternative and creative business models for delivering legal services 
at prices much more in line with the financial realities of middle- and lower-income 
clients”). 
96 Steven K. Berenson, A Cloak for the Bare: In Support of Allowing Prospective 
Malpractice Liability Waivers in Certain Pro Bono Cases, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 26 (2005) 
(“[I]t seems probable that small firm and solo practitioners are more likely to ‘go bare,’ that 
is, practice without malpractice insurance coverage, than their colleagues in larger firms.”).  
97 Id. (“Medium- and large-size firms are more likely to have the resources necessary to 
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Eliminating the corporate practice restrictions could help connect willing 
buyers and willing sellers.98 An existing corporation might hire attorneys to 
provide affordable legal services to individual clients; some have speculated 
that WalMart could integrate legal services into store locations that already 
offer banking and optometry services in many areas, or that Google could 
expand its technological empire into computer-assisted legal services.99 In 
medicine, where there has been a greater move away from corporate practice 
restrictions, it has been easier to measure the doctrine’s effect on access to 
care; experience has shown that allowing physicians to practice in “efficient 
and economical” business forms improves access to medical care for 
individuals, especially in rural or remote areas where the fixed costs of practice 
may not allow a single doctor’s practice to scale to an efficient level.100 
With regard to legal services in particular, some have questioned whether 
there is truly an untapped market of people willing and able to pay for legal 
services.101 It is certainly true that for the most destitute, lower prices may 
matter less than access to publicly funded services (though there is still unmet 
need even in the population currently eligible for subsidized services).102 For 
 
obtain malpractice insurance coverage. On the other hand, a greater percentage of small-
firm and solo practitioners may lack the resources necessary to obtain adequate coverage.”). 
98 Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical 
View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 268 (1985) (“Salaried lawyers, often 
younger ones, constitute another group who lose by virtue of rules like 5.4. Because only 
other lawyers may hire them to provide legal services to third persons for a profit, the 
number of these jobs will be limited by the number of lawyers willing to create them. If the 
ban on lay participation were lifted, the number of these jobs likely would expand. Legal 
time can be a remunerative product bought wholesale and sold retail.”). 
99 Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (“Corporations like Google and Wal-Mart know a great deal about the 
delivery of services, goods, and information to the mass public. These corporations and 
many others have the capacity to make significant financial outlays into innovative 
mechanisms for providing legal services and await a delayed return on that investment.”). 
100 Michele Gustavson & Nick Taylor, At Death’s Door – Idaho’s Corporate Practice of 
Medicine Doctrine, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 479, 518 (2011) (“Physicians especially have a 
disincentive to practice in rural or remote areas, which inherently pose significant economic 
risks due to their size and disadvantaged status. Corporations are more qualified to shoulder 
the economic risks by hiring physicians full-time.”); Conway, supra note 41, at 3 
(summarizing arguments “that the doctrine acts as a barrier to address the growing shortage 
of physicians in rural areas of the state”). 
101 Paul Campos, Law and Economics, LAW. GUNS & MONEY (Jan. 31, 2013), http:// 
www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2013/01/law-and-economics (“The reason ordinary folk 
don’t pay for legal services even when in theory they could benefit from them is exactly the 
same reason they don’t pay for a lot of things they could in theory benefit from: because 
they don’t have any money for those things after paying for more pressing needs . . . .”). 
102 Earl Johnson, Jr., Equality Before the Law and the Social Contract: When Will the 
United States Finally Guarantee Its People the Equality Before the Law the Social Contract 
Demands?, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157, 213 (2010) (“[T]he Medicaid budget provides over 
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the middle class, however, affordability is essential to access103 – and at the 
current time, the middle class is largely priced out of the traditional market.104 
Additionally, the rapid growth and expansion of low-cost technological 
alternatives like LegalZoom and LawPivot suggests that if the price of legal 
services were lowered, demand would indeed increase.105 Thus, while lower 
prices would not solve the access-to-justice problem alone, they would 
nevertheless mitigate the problem, particularly for the middle class.106 
III. THE CHANGING PROFESSIONAL LANDSCAPE 
As the previous Section argues, the corporate practice doctrine significantly 
limits access to professional advice by restricting the business forms in which 
professionals may practice. Given the negative effect on access, any client-
oriented defense of the doctrine must therefore rely on two premises: first, that 
restricting access increases the quality of service rendered to those who remain 
in the market for professional care, and second, that those who are priced out 
of the market are better off with no access to professional service than they 
would be with access to the lower-quality services they might receive in an 
unrestricted professional marketplace. 
Evidence from the states that have loosened restrictions on the corporate 
practice of medicine suggests that the first premise is false.107 At least for 
routine services, the evidence suggests that allowing doctors to contract for 
employment with corporate entities increases access to care without 
diminishing the quality of that care.108 A study of ophthalmologists found that 
there was no difference in quality between corporate practices and physician-
owned practices, but that restricting corporate practice raised prices by five to 
thirteen percent.109 Another study of dentists found that corporate practices 
actually provided higher levels of care for the most common services, though 
the study concluded that these corporate practices were not as good at 
 
$4,500 per eligible patient, while civil legal aid only has $20 per eligible client.”). 
103 The Supreme Court made this point when it struck down attorney advertising 
restrictions. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 370 (1977) (“Studies reveal that many 
persons do not obtain counsel even when they perceive a need because of the feared price of 
services or because of an inability to locate a competent attorney.”). 
104 Robertson, supra note 91, at 78-80 (discussing how less than half of middle-class 
families with legal needs can afford to go to court and hire legal representation); Hadfield, 
supra note 3 (manuscript at 10) (“Conventional legal services are simply beyond the means 
of most Americans.”). 
105 See Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 22-23). 
106 See Robertson, supra note 91, at 79. 
107 KIM, supra note 83, at 22-23 (describing studies that reveal “no statistically 
significant relationship between commercial practice restrictions and higher quality” 
medical treatment). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 22. 
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providing complex services such as dental surgery.110 Thus, both cost and 
quality are likely to be best served by eliminating restrictions on corporate 
practice.111 Even if the benefits are limited to routine care, the overall effect 
remains. Allowing outside investment would not eliminate traditional entities, 
but would merely allow the creation of alternatives – so high-end boutique care 
with professional ownership would still be available.112 In addition, new 
businesses with a focus on expanded access and a possible emphasis on routine 
care would be allowed to supplement the high-end care offered by the boutique 
firms, thus increasing overall access to care. 
The failure of the first premise – that corporate practice restrictions improve 
the quality of service – should be enough by itself to support ending such 
restrictions. After all, if allowing corporate practice reduces cost without 
reducing quality, then there is no legitimate policy reason to keep the corporate 
practice restrictions in place. Nevertheless, in case some are not convinced by 
the available data on quality of service, it is worth examining the second 
premise: Assuming that corporate practice restrictions did increase the quality 
of service, what is the fate of those priced out of the market for professional 
services – are they insulated from harmful or misleading guidance in the 
medical or legal arena? 
The answer to this question has changed over time, with both positive and 
negative effects. In the past, regulators might have reasonably believed that the 
public was better off with no care than with substandard care. Eighty years 
ago, when these restrictions were first implemented, there was no evidence 
contradicting that the view that information in the wrong hands could present a 
danger to the public; and, without the ability to hire a professional, laypeople 
were largely excluded from knowledge about legal and medical matters.113 In 
 
110 Id. at 22-23 (“An unpublished FTC study found commercial dentistry practices (i.e., 
practices that employ at least one non-owner dentist, have at least three offices, and 
advertise) provided higher quality for most common services but lower quality for complex 
services, such as surgery.”). 
111 See id.  
112 Jurisdictions that have permitted outside investment have seen some, but not all, firms 
choose to restructure. See Chris Johnson, Continental Breakfast: Three U.K. Firms Ink 
External Investment Deals as Legal Services Shakeup Starts, AM. LAW. (Feb. 10, 2012, 
12:05 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2012/02/ukexternalinvestmentdeals. 
html (stating that in England, “[a] select group of U.K. top 100 firms have publicly 
announced plans to convert to the new structure,” but that “major international and elite 
corporate law firms are less likely to turn to external capital – at least in the near future”). 
113 Silver v. Lansburgh & Bro., 111 F.2d 518, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (observing that 
previous cases had distinguished professions that were prohibited from engaging in 
corporate practice from trades that did not require such protection “mainly upon the 
difference in the required degree of learning and training,” but concluding that the private 
nature and confidential communications required for medical and legal advice offered an 
even sounder rationale for the prohibition, as “[t]hese necessary disclosures create the 
personal relationship which cannot exist between patient or client and a profit-seeking 
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the modern era, that belief is no longer reasonable. The growth of technology 
and the globalization of everyday life mean that individuals have greater access 
than ever before to information that was previously the exclusive domain of 
licensed professionals.114 To the extent that modern communication technology 
enables the public to provide adequate self-care even if priced out of the 
market for professional services, this is a net positive benefit to society. To the 
extent that such technology exposes individuals to harmful or misleading 
advice, the effect may be negative. In both cases, however, the development of 
this communications technology diminishes the argument in favor of 
restricting professional services: in the modern era, any attempt to insulate 
laypeople from specialized knowledge is doomed to failure. 
A. The Internet and Social Media 
In the past, a person who could not afford to seek legal or medical advice 
was faced with few resources. Self-study (in medicine) or self-representation 
(in law) offered one option; seeking advice from friends or family members 
offered another. Neither of these options, however, operated as a reasonable 
substitute for professional advice; after all, doctors and lawyers have years of 
specialized education and training, as well as a great deal of specialized 
knowledge that would not be easy to replicate elsewhere. Thus, individuals 
might well have sought help from nonprofessional sources, and might have 
gotten good advice or bad advice from doing so. Nevertheless, the alternative 
sources of information did not generally present a strong alternative to 
professional care, and regulatory action combatting the unauthorized practice 
of law and medicine ensured that these outsider sources of information 
remained limited.115 
The internet, however, is a game changer. The sheer quantity of information 
available to an individual can come much closer to replicating the role of 
professional advice; as a result, there is no doubt that modern technology 
disrupts the current regulatory regime.116 Instead of seeking advice from a 
 
corporation”). 
114 Stephen Gillers, A Profession, If You Can Keep It: How Information Technology and 
Fading Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What We Should Do About It, 63 
HASTINGS L.J. 953, 1021-22 (2012) (“What is not wise is intransigence when the gap 
between socially beneficial conduct and the rules that constrict the conduct grows large. We 
have entered such a period for the rules governing the legal marketplace, and it is in large 
part a product of changing technology and the cross-border activity of lawyers and 
clients.”). 
115 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers 
to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 453 n.80 (1988) (noting that 
courts have sustained “unauthorized practice of medicine” challenges in areas as diverse 
faith healing, nutritional advice, and tattooing). 
116 Kristin Madison, Regulating Health Care Quality in an Information Age, 40 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1577, 1651 (2007) (“The health care regulatory framework will and should 
survive the health information revolution, but in altered form. . . . [I]t should prompt a shift 
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single individual, the internet allows an individual to seek advice from the 
“wisdom of the crowd.”117 In the aggregate, the collective knowledge even of 
laypeople can be a reasonable substitute for the more specialized knowledge 
possessed by an individual professional.118 
In the medical realm, for example, a recent case study of parents who 
searched “Doctor Google” for clues to their children’s illnesses found that the 
parents were able to use the information gained from the internet to lead their 
doctors to a correct diagnosis of their children’s rare disorders.119 The parents 
were not medical specialists and were of merely “average education,” but by 
searching their children’s symptoms, they were able to obtain an accurate 
diagnosis.120 Internet search engines have also made it easier for people to self-
diagnose their own disorders correctly, especially in the case of minor 
illnesses.121 If medical diagnosis presents a puzzle, the internet may allow 
individuals to access enough disparate bits of information – symptoms, similar 
cases histories, and related information – to allow even a layperson to put the 
pieces together.122 
Tapping into social connections through social media allows an individual 
to combine data from professional and nonprofessional sources of 
information.123 Thus, for example, a person going through a difficult divorce 
 
away from market-displacing approaches toward the market-channeling and market-
facilitating regulatory approaches that can more easily accommodate variations in patient 
preferences for the quality of care.”). 
117 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 57 (2004).  
118 Id. (explaining the value of collective wisdom and commenting that “[c]ollective 
decisions are most likely to be good ones when they’re made by people with diverse 
opinions reaching independent conclusions, relying primarily on their private information”). 
119 Machtelt G. Bouwman et al., ‘Doctor Google’ Ending the Diagnostic Odyssey in 
Lysosomal Storage Disorders: Parents Using Internet Search Engines as an Efficient 
Diagnostic Strategy in Rare Diseases, 95 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 642, 643 (2010). 
120 Id. 
121 J. Escarrabill et al., Good Morning, Doctor Google, 17 REVISTA PORTUGUESA DE 
PNEUMOLOGÍA 177, 179 (2011) (“Google is useful for patients to diagnose their own 
complaints and, in some instances, they use it in a quicker and more effective manner than 
the doctors, especially in cases of minor illnesses.”). 
122 Databases of electronic health records can play a similar role in aggregating disparate 
information, even substituting for clinical trials in some instances. See, e.g., Sharona 
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs in 
Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 101 (2012) (“[O]bservational 
studies have several advantages over clinical trials. EHR databases could allow researchers 
to access vast amounts of information about patients with diverse demographics collected 
over a much longer period of time than that encompassed by clinical trials, which typically 
last only a few years.”). 
123 Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the 
Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 151 (1999) (“In cyberspace, the much-decried unmet legal 
needs of middle-income people are available for the world to see, with just a few clicks of a 
mouse. The Internet abounds with tales of legal woe, presented through a number of 
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who suspects that his lawyers are not diligently pursuing his interests in the 
litigation might reach out to tap into the collective wisdom of his online social 
network.124 Some of his Facebook friends may be lawyers, though perhaps in 
different practice areas; other friends may have gone through acrimonious 
divorces themselves, and may have experience with the legal process from the 
client side. Those with experience in either realm “can give him a second 
opinion on whether his concerns are warranted; they may post reassurances, 
suggestions for other attorneys to hire, or even information about how to report 
the attorneys for bar discipline.”125 Through this process, the individual can tap 
into the aggregated collective wisdom of his social connections in a way that 
would be difficult or even impossible to replicate in person, where he would 
have to wade through numerous individual conversations in an effort to 
determine who in his social circle could have relevant information.126 
Other websites aggregate more specialized professional information, but do 
so outside the traditional professional-layperson relationship. Two companies 
in the legal services field, LawPivot127 and LegalZoom,128 maintain websites 
where attorneys answer questions posed by persons without legal 
representation. In contrast to traditional models of the attorney-client 
relationship, the advice offered by such attorneys is not provided confidentially 
to a single client; instead, it is archived on a public website, and intended to 
provide assistance to future searchers with similar questions in addition to 
helping the original poster who sought the advice.129 Similar websites allow 
doctors to post medical advice on sites that serve both to offer individualized 
advice and to archive that advice for future searches.130 
Other websites may offer a forum for crowdsourced wisdom that does not 
intentionally seek to enter the realm of professional advice, but finds instead 
that medical and legal issues are not easily severable from the more general 
issues that arise in everyday life. One of the best known sources of 
crowdsourced wisdom is Ask Metafilter – the tagline for which is “querying 
the hive mind” – a general advice site and offshoot of a popular community 
 
different vehicles.”). 
124 Robertson, supra note 91, at 84. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 LAWPIVOT, https://www.lawpivot.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
128 LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2013); see also 
LegalZoom-Free Joe!, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/LegalZoom?sk=app_1053151 
4314 (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) (providing a service on Facebook that allows users to 
receive answers to their legal questions from an attorney by posting their questions to 
LegalZoom’s Facebook page).  
129 Robertson, supra note 91, at 84. 
130 See, e.g., Randall Stross, Advice for the Ill, and Points for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
5, 2012, at BU3; HEALTHTAP, http://www.healthtap.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
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blog.131 The site routinely crowdsources general advice in questions that range 
from attempts to identify dimly remembered childhood books,132 queries about 
how to deal with roommates’ different religious beliefs,133 and requests for 
advice about which investment fund to choose for retirement contributions.134 
Some questions in the mix will seek advice in areas typically handled by 
professionals; legal, medical, and tax advice are commonly sought.135 The 
community – made up of both professionals and laypeople – has struggled with 
the issue of how to handle such questions.136 Some have advocated a minimal 
response suggesting only that the asker seek help from a licensed professional 
– though even a suggestion to “go to the emergency room” is a type of medical 
advice itself.137 Others, however, have been willing to provide more detailed 
answers, often with the disclaimer IANAL (I Am Not A Lawyer) or 
IAALBIANYL (I Am A Lawyer, But I Am Not Your Lawyer).138 
Members of these online communities have expressed concern that offering 
advice about professional matters can lead to problems, for the individuals who 
may get bad advice and for the potential professional liability issues of those 
who offer it.139 But in spite of these concerns, attempts to discourage such 
 
131 Robertson, supra note 91, at 84. 
132 What Children’s Book of Horror Stories Am I Trying to Remember?, ASK 
METAFILTER (Feb. 15, 2013, 10:59 PM), http://ask.metafilter.com/235380/What-childrens-
book-of-horror-stories-am-I-trying-to-remember. 
133 Jesus Says No!, ASK METAFILTER (Feb. 15, 2013, 8:39 PM), http://ask.metafilter.com 
/235378/Jesus-says-no. 
134 Help Me Choose Between 5 Vanguard Funds, ASK METAFILTER (Feb. 15, 2013, 8:04 
PM), http://ask.metafilter.com/235377/Help-me-choose-between-5-Vanguard-Funds. 
135 Policy Against Legal, Medical, and Tax Advice?, METATALK (Mar. 1, 2004, 8:34 
AM), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/5554/Policy-against-legal-medical-and-tax-advice. 
136 Id. (“Requests for very specific legal, medical, and tax advice make me nervous. 
There should be some policy against these, or at least a very bold warning strongly 
discouraging and expressly disclaiming liability against responses in these threads.”). 
137 Taz, Comment to Irresponsible Medical Advice and What to Do with It, METATALK 
(Feb. 1, 2013, 9:58 PM), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/22388 (“Medical questions are 
always a bone of contention, but mostly people are pretty good about telling people to go to 
the doctor / emergency room instead of relying on the advice of people who are not trained, 
. . . I do think that it can be better for someone who doesn’t have access to medical care 
because of lack of insurance or whatever to get a whole lot of comments saying ‘go ahead 
and go to ER because this sounds bad,’ when that’s the case.”). 
138 ClaudiaCenter, Comment to IAALBIANYL, METATALK (Dec. 21, 2007, 9:23 PM), 
http://metatalk.metafilter.com/15513/IAALBIANYL (“I think it’s really important for 
lawyers to provide access to legal information so that non-lawyers can assess their 
situations. We [lawyers] often know very easily where is the relevant guidance, document, 
statute, regulation to review, and just giving the lay of the land can be very useful to 
people.”). 
139 See, e.g., Irresponsible Medical Advice and What to Do with It, METATALK (Feb. 1, 
2013, 9:58 PM), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/22388; Policy Against Legal, Medical, and 
Tax Advice?, METATALK (Mar. 1, 2004, 8:34 AM), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/5554/ 
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advice have proven unsuccessful.140 As one scholar has noted about the online 
discussion of legal problems, “what may be most surprising to the casual 
observer is not that so many laypeople want legal advice to help them solve 
their problems. Rather, it is that so many lawyers are apparently willing to 
provide it.”141 
But while professional liability or other sanctions are a theoretical 
possibility for professional advice rendered without due care or full 
information, lawyers, doctors, and other professionals may rightly perceive 
their online discussions to be beyond the bounds of the state’s effective 
regulatory power.142 Their advice may be rendered anonymously; it may cross 
geographical borders; it may form only a small part of the advice given to a 
particular individual, and therefore pose less of a risk of undue reliance.143 
None of these factors necessarily insulates the professional from liability or 
discipline, but those factors taken together may make such consequences 
unlikely enough that the professionals do not feel the need to self-censor 
online.144 As a result, the online marketplace for advice about medical and 
legal matters remains robust, and regulatory attempts to limit or restrict 
individuals’ exposure to risky information will be ineffective.145 
 
Policy-against-legal-medical-and-tax-advice; see also Robertson, supra note 91, at 84-85. 
140 See supra note 139. 
141 Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the 
Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 156 (1999). 
142 Robertson, supra note 91, at 86-87 (explaining that “limited-advice services like those 
offered by LegalZoom may be vulnerable to challenge if the attorneys offering the advice 
are not licensed in the client’s jurisdiction,” but that the online advice sites nevertheless 
remain active and robust). 
143 Id. (“The automated services are vulnerable to challenges by state unauthorized-
practice committees, however – and even semi-automated limited-advice services like those 
offered by LegalZoom may be vulnerable to challenge if the attorneys offering the advice 
are not licensed in the client’s jurisdiction.”). 
144 See ClaudiaCenter, supra note 138 (explaining a lawyer’s belief in the importance of 
open communication about legal information). Another poster to MetaTalk was similarly 
straightforward about his or her profession: 
[M]edical questions are not going away and I have no problem being public about my 
profession. But these days I tend to limit my participation in threads to the very easily 
answerable (what is this rash I took a picture of? Should I keep playing soccer when I 
have this pain right here?) or to questions about navigating the medical system (what 
questions should I ask my doctor before my gall bladder surgery? How can I find a 
mental health doctor in Seattle without insurance?) and stay far away from anything 
trickier (I’m peeing blood, what kind of cancer do I have?). 
Slarty Bartfast, Comment to Irresponsible Medical Advice and What to Do with It, 
METATALK (Feb. 2, 2013, 8:43 PM), http://metatalk.metafilter.com/22388. 
145 Nicolas P. Terry, Under-Regulated Health Care Phenomena in a Flat World: Medical 
Tourism and Outsourcing, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 438 (2007) (“Other than urging 
‘surfer-beware’ and promoting information about high quality sites, there is little to be done 
to protect American virtual tourists against the harm they might suffer from relying on either 
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B. Globalization 
While online sources of information may extend beyond the state’s 
regulatory reach as a de facto matter, global professional service providers may 
exceed the state’s regulatory power even de jure if there is no coordinated 
international regime.146 For example, telemedicine allow doctors in one 
country to treat patients in another.147 In addition, a growing number of 
patients are engaging in “medical tourism” and traveling outside the United 
States for more affordable medical procedures than the patients could obtain in 
the United States.148 Because the foreign health care providers fall outside the 
state’s regulatory reach, however, any attempt to discourage or limit such 
medial tourism would require placing restrictions on the individuals who seek 
such care, such as limiting their right to travel or placing criminal sanctions on 
their pursuit of foreign medical treatment; and, even if such restrictions could 
be constitutionally enacted, they would be nearly impossible to enforce.149 
Legal services are even easier to outsource across borders – and 
concomitantly harder to regulate – because most legal work can be done 
remotely, with no need to travel.150 To the extent that U.S. lawyers are 
involved in the outsourcing process, their actions will fall under their state’s 
 
domestic or foreign Web content.”). 
146 See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Globalization and Structure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
431, 452 (2011) (“Globalization has produced an impact on the economy and society that is 
equally as remarkable today as nationalization was more than a century ago. . . . As with 
nationalization, effective solutions need to be global.”). 
147 Amar Gupta & Deth Sao, The Constitutionality of Current Legal Barriers to 
Telemedicine in the United States: Analysis and Future Directions of Its Relationship to 
National and International Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 385, 442 (2011) (“The 
cross-border nature of telemedicine involves opportunities and challenges, as the ability to 
deliver health care across distances not only achieves public policy goals of greater quality 
and access to health care, but also creates jurisdictional conflicts within and among 
nations.”). 
148 I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the 
Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1566 (2010) (“Medical tourism is 
already an important phenomenon in U.S. healthcare and growing steadily.”). 
149 Id. at 1512 (“[A]dministering such a system would not be easy: it would require the 
detection of the consumption of medical services abroad in a situation where neither party 
has an incentive to alert the U.S. government. It would also require prosecutors and courts to 
distinguish medical care purchased incident to other travel from medical tourism pursued as 
the primary purpose for a trip.”). 
150 Mark I. Harrison & Mary Gray Davidson, The Ethical Implications of Partnerships 
and Other Associations Involving American and Foreign Lawyers, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. 
REV. 639, 639 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer 
Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 324 (2004) (“Internet law practice can provide effective 
legal assistance on routine matters . . . . [T]hese new business methods demand a clearer 
theory of the appropriate scope of regulation than is provided by the existing analytical 
framework.”); Robertson, supra note 91, at 178-79. 
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regulatory authority.151 In other cases, however, potential clients may 
communicate directly with overseas legal services vendors, bypassing U.S. 
lawyers altogether.152 One company, located in India, advertises its ability to 
work with self-represented litigants; it provides advice, document drafting and 
preparation, and legal research.153 Foreign companies and individuals can also 
bid for legal projects on Elance.com, a network for freelancing.154 One U.S. 
resident – a nonlawyer – sought legal assistance with a foreclosure proceeding 
in which he was attempting to represent himself.155 The client ended up hiring 
a “Global Virtual Law Firm” based in India; the client awarded the firm “five 
stars” for price, though only “two stars” for quality, commenting that the firm 
“did not know local court rules very well, and answered some questions about 
that incorrectly.”156 Another pro se litigant (a self-reported “demanding client” 
and “very active pro se litigant”) hired the same firm to prepare a motion for 
partial summary judgment to be filed in a court in Orange County, California; 
that litigant awarded the firm five stars for quality, expertise, and cost.157 Self-
represented litigants are at a significant disadvantage in litigation generally; 
even a limited amount of help from an overseas legal service provider may 
improve the litigant’s courtroom experience.158 
These overseas service providers may violate state unauthorized practice of 
law rules by providing legal advice and document drafting for state residents 
pursuing litigation in state courts.159 Nonetheless, this activity is likely to be 
 
151 Robertson, supra note 91, at 90 (“As with automated services, outsourcing the 
preparation of legal documents may run up against state prohibitions on the unauthorized 
practice of law.”). 
152 Id. at 89-90 (“Offshore legal outsourcing supplies a global-labor arbitrage, making 
legal services affordable to a broader range of litigants – but also putting some legal service 
providers beyond the state’s regulatory reach.”). 
153 Testimonials, SUNLEXIS, http://www.sunlexis.com/testimonials.html (last visited Nov. 
16, 2013). 
154 ELANCE, https://www.elance.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
155 Foreclosure Litigation Support, ELANCE (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.elance.com/s/ 
advjollyjohn/job-history/?t=1&k=foreclosure#search. 
156 Id. 
157 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-Orange County Ca Court [OCSC], ELANCE 
(Oct. 22, 2011), https://www.elance.com/s/advjollyjohn/job-history/?t=1&k=Motion#search 
(“NOT only is the work produced timely, its thorough, complete, well researched, 
professionaly [sic] presented, properly formatted and ready for filing.”). 
158 See Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship – a Legal 
Crisis and Its Solutions, 45 FAMILY L.Q. 45, 46 (2011) (“Sixty-two percent of judges said 
that outcomes were worse for the unrepresented parties.”); Cf. Cassandra Burke Robertson, 
Regulating Electronic Legal Support Across State and National Boundaries, 47 AKRON L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6) (on file with author). 
159 Mary C. Daly & Carole Silver, Flattening the World of Legal Services? The Ethical 
and Liability Minefields of Offshoring Legal and Law-Related Services, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
401, 427-30 (2007) (“[O]ffshoring frequently raises the threshold issue of the unauthorized 
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even harder for regulators to reach than medical tourism; the litigants’ free 
speech rights likely protect their communications with offshore legal service 
providers.160 The offshore service providers are also likely beyond the state’s 
regulatory reach, as it would be an excessive assertion of legislative 
jurisdiction for the United States to regulate the conditions under which such 
providers can offer legal advice or assistance; an individual located in a foreign 
country who merely communicates with individuals in the United States does 
not thereby subject himself or herself to speech restrictions of domestic law.161 
Furthermore, the opportunities for global cooperation in legal services are 
increasing. Other countries have recently liberalized their practice rules in 
ways that may allow them to compete for business with U.S. clients.162 In 
England and Wales, the 2007 Legal Services Act liberalized the provision of 
legal services.163 Provisions of the Act that went into effect in late 2011 
permitted “law firms [to] seek investment from third parties for the first time 
 
practice of law (UPL) because the work is being sent directly to foreign lawyers who are not 
authorized to practice law in the United States or to vendors outside the United States who 
employ the foreign lawyers and/or non-legal professionals.”); Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting: 
Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 
314 (2010) (“[A] large majority of states that explicitly define the practice of law consider 
the drafting of legal documents to fit within the definition.”); Robertson, supra note 91, at 
90-91. 
160 Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62 (1981) 
(“Unauthorized practice prohibitions plainly implicate first amendment values by restricting 
both the lay speaker’s ability to convey information and the public’s opportunities to receive 
it. If such restrictions impede access to the courts or the exercise of associational interests, 
further constitutional questions arise.”); Robertson, supra note 91, at 91. 
161 Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 815, 874 (2009) (“Global governance based on extraterritorial domestic laws is an 
unsustainable and unstable system.”). 
162 See Bruce MacEwen et al., Conversation: Law Firms, Ethics, and Equity Capital, 21 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 61, 61 (2008) (exploring how the “prospect of major UK firms raising 
capital in the equity markets . . . has the potential to produce seismic shifts in the global 
market for legal services [including] far-reaching implications for the legal profession that 
we can barely anticipate”). 
163 Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 71-111 (Eng.); see also Thomas D. Morgan, The 
Rise of Institutional Law Practice, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005, 1020 (2012) (“Although U.S. 
lawyers are now barred from participating in multi-disciplinary firms that deliver legal 
services in the United States, American clients can often get the services from firms 
operating out of the United Kingdom or Australia, which have adopted programs permitting 
– but registering and regulating – what the British call ‘alternative business structures.’”); 
Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving 
the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2242 (2010) (“The English and 
Australian experiences, in particular, demonstrate that thinking about the profession as a 
business does not have to mean the abandonment of ‘core values’ as the profession 
evolves.”). 
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and companies that are not law firms [to] provide legal services.”164 The Act 
was dubbed the “Tesco Law” after a large British grocery retailer: with 
retailers allowed to offer legal services, the law was thought to make it as easy 
to buy legal services as it was to buy beans.165 In Australia, the Legal 
Profession Acts permit “incorporated legal practices” and allow revenue 
sharing with nonlawyers.166 As a result of the Australian reforms, the firm of 
Slater & Gordon became the world’s first publicly traded law firm; its IPO 
raised twenty-nine million dollars.167 After the English reforms of 2011 were 
implemented, Slater & Gordon then purchased the U.K. firm of Russell Jones 
& Walker for eighty-five million dollars.168 
As these reforms take root, potential clients in the United States may be able 
to work with legal services providers headquartered in England or Australia 
because the General Agreement on the Trade of Services (GATS) prohibits 
signatories from restricting “trading in a domestic market purely on the basis 
of their business structure.”169 Thus, the effects of these international reforms 
may hasten the pace of Professor Bill Henderson’s prediction: “In ten years, 
much of the deregulation agenda will come to pass without any formal 
 
164 Caroline Binham, OFT Says ‘Tesco Law’ Approvals Too Slow, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18, 
2013, 2:26 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/67a46fb8-615e-11e2-9545-00144feab49a. 
html#axzz2L7w0hHdl. 
165 Douglas McCollam, Law as a Tin of Beans: British Government Proposes Alternative 
Business Structures for Law Firms to Make Legal System More Consumer-Friendly, N.J. 
L.J., Oct. 31, 2005, at 20 (“Bridget Prentice, a minister at the Department of Constitutional 
Affairs, said she envisioned a legal system where someone could pick a lawyer ‘as easily as 
they can buy a tin of beans.’ Indeed, wags have dubbed the reforms the ‘Tesco Law’ after 
the well-known British supermarket chain.”). 
166 See, e.g., Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ch 2 ss 111(1), 128(1) (Austl.) (designating 
corporations as “incorporated legal practices” regardless of whether they provide additional 
nonlegal services or receive revenue from said services); Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers 
Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2791, 2817 n.143 (2012) (“Every Australian state and territory but South Australia has 
passed a similar act based on the Model Legal Profession Bill.”). 
167 Johnson, supra note 112. 
168 Id.; see also Andrew Grech & Kirsten Morrison, Slater & Gordon: The Listing 
Experience, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535, 535 (2009) (“On May 21, 2007, Slater & Gordon 
became the first law firm in the world to list its entire practice on the Australian Stock 
Exchange. As this case study will illustrate, the process of listing raised significant ethical 
and practical issues that had to be considered.”); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Lawyers, Symbols, 
and Money: Outside Investment in Law Firms, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 407, 407-08 
(2008). 
169 Steven Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Innovations in Regulation—Responding to a 
Changing Legal Services Market, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 518-19 (2009); see also 
INT’L BAR ASS’N, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES, A HANDBOOK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION MEMBER BARS 10, http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/ 
s/lst3/IBA%20GATS%20Handbook%20final.pdf; Laurel S. Terry, From GATS to APEC: 
The Impact of Trade Agreements on Legal Services, 43 AKRON L. REV. 875, 881-82 (2010). 
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deregulation. U.S. consumers and businesses are already voting with their 
feet.”170 If this de facto deregulation excludes professionals licensed in the 
United States, however, no one benefits – not the professionals who become 
marginalized in the market for professional services, and not the clients 
seeking affordable professional care.171 
IV. CHALLENGING CORPORATE PRACTICE RESTRICTIONS 
Given the counterproductive effects of the corporate practice doctrine, it 
may surprise onlookers that the political process has not yet unseated the 
doctrine. As the Supreme Court noted when upholding a state regulation that 
forbade anyone but a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist from dispensing 
glasses (including merely putting previously dispensed lenses into new 
frames), legislative solutions are the preferred cure for unwise and improvident 
state regulations.172 Legislative solutions, however, can be difficult to obtain. 
It is true that the political process has had some limited success in the 
medical field, as Congress has enacted laws allowing corporate practice for 
HMOs and for the new “Accountable Care Organizations.”173 In addition, the 
Federal Trade Commission’s challenge to the AMA rule may represent a 
mixed political-judicial challenge to the rule against corporate practice.174 
What we have not seen, however, is concerted action at the state legislative 
level – for the most part, states have not been willing to overrule previous 
restrictions on corporate practice systematically.175 This reluctance is 
especially prevalent in the legal field,176 though it is also a factor in medicine 
 
170 William Henderson, Are We Asking the Wrong Questions About Lawyer Regulation?, 
TRUTH ON MKT. (Sept. 19, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/09/19/william-
henderson-on-are-we-asking-the-wrong-questions-about-lawyer-regulation. 
171 See, e.g., Bill Henderson, Who Are These Companies?, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Feb. 2, 
2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/02/who-are-these-companies 
.html (demonstrating that legal services companies are already making inroads into the 
domestic legal market by posting a photo of the exhibitor list at the LegalTech New York 
trade show and commenting, “[i]f you think that the ethics rules (MR 5.4) are keeping 
nonlawyers out the legal industry, you need to come to LegalTech”). 
172 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“For protection 
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.” (quoting 
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876))). 
173 See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text (detailing how two instances of federal 
legislation preempted state law restrictions on corporate practice in the medical services 
industry). 
174 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (explaining the FTC’s challenge and its 
subsequent affirmation by the Second Circuit). 
175 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (describing how certain state 
restrictions on corporate practice have been preempted by federal law, while some states 
actively attempted to restrict corporate practice with few states revisiting the issue in order 
to permit it). 
176 Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 3-4) (describing the results of a New York State 
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as well; in fact, it helps explain why laws against the corporate practice of 
medicine remained on the books even when they were unenforced at the state 
level.177 
Thus, as a practical matter, it is hard to obtain a political solution to the 
corporate practice problem even when a majority of a state’s voters would, in 
theory, favor such an outcome if given a voice on the matter. In practice, state 
legislators may be reluctant to eliminate regulatory restrictions when those 
who would benefit (middle class individuals seeking access to services) remain 
unaware of the doctrine, while those who might face competition (licensed 
professionals) are not only keenly aware of the doctrine, but in fact lobby 
vigorously in favor of retaining the rule.178 State courts have also been 
reluctant to abolish the doctrine under the common law, instead preferring to 
defer to legislative bodies.179 Courts have expressed this deference even in 
cases where the corporate practice doctrine itself had no statutory basis, but 
was instead created as a common law doctrine by the same courts that were, 
decades later, unwilling to repeal those doctrines without explicit legislative 
permission.180 
 
Bar Association survey in which “78% of lawyers in New York opposed the . . . proposal to 
allow nonlawyer ownership in law firms”). 
177 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (highlighting unenforced state law that, if 
enforced, would restrict corporate practice in the medical services industry). 
178 Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional Responsibility of 
the Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 365, 403 (2013) (asserting that lawyers “lobbied 
hard” against even the mere discussion of opening the profession to outside investment); 
Gustavson & Taylor, supra note 100, at 493 (explaining that states adopted corporate 
practice restrictions in response to lobbying from physicians through the American Medical 
Association); Elizabeth A. Snelson, Physician Employment and Alternative Practice 
Strategies: Avoiding “Company Doctor” Syndrome & Other Hospital Medical Staff Issues, 
HEALTH LAW., Dec. 2008, at 14, 14 (explaining that the decision of some states to exempt 
hospitals from the corporate practice ban arose in part “through hospital industry lobbying 
in the legislatures and as parties and amici curiae in the courts”). 
179 See, e.g., Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins., 703 N.W.2d 513, 524 (Minn. 
2005) (“We do not agree, however, that the courts are the proper forum to enact such policy 
change. The legislature is the appropriate branch of government to debate and evaluate the 
necessity of alternative forms of health care delivery in this state.”); Wash. Imaging Servs. 
v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 252 P.3d 885, 890 (Wash. 2011) (“It is true that under the 
common law corporate practice of medicine doctrine, absent legislative authorization, a 
business may not engage in the practice of medicine by employing licensed physicians. . . . 
However, the common law corporate practice of medicine doctrine does not prevent persons 
without medical licenses from providing medical services through independent contractor 
physicians.”). 
180 Isles Wellness, 703 N.W.2d at 524; see also id. at 527 (Hanson, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (stating that to the extent that the corporate practice doctrine was part 
of Minnesota’s common law, “I would not defer to the legislature, but see it as the court’s 
responsibility to reexamine our own ruling”); Wash. Imaging Servs., 252 P.3d at 890 
(“[U]nder the common law corporate practice of medicine doctrine, absent legislative 
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Political solutions are doubly difficult to obtain in the field of lawyer 
regulation. Because state courts have historically been charged with exclusive 
authority to regulate the practice of law under the separation of powers 
doctrine, legislative changes by themselves may have no practical effect even 
if adopted – state courts have shown a willingness to strike down legislation 
that infringes on the courts’ exclusive power to regulate legal practice.181 And 
when both the state legislature and the state courts have adopted restrictions on 
the corporate practice of law, then it can be especially difficult to challenge 
those restrictions.182 First, success in one arena would be insufficient to change 
the rule – to be successful, a challenger would have to challenge both the 
statute and the court rule. Second, and further complicating the issue, is a 
question of timing: If the statute’s effect is not clear, judges may want to 
abstain from deciding a constitutional challenge to it; but if the statute is not 
challenged, then a challenge to the court rule may well be moot.183 
Jacoby & Meyers’s challenge to New York’s corporate practice restrictions 
demonstrates the difficulty of challenging these restrictions within the larger 
thicket of lawyer regulation.184 If the firm challenged a state statute that was 
less than clear, but that could be interpreted to forbid corporate practice, the 
district court might reasonably abstain from deciding the case under Railroad 
Commission v. Pullman Co., as the state courts had not yet had an opportunity 
to interpret the statute.185 If the firm did not challenge the statute, however, 
 
authorization, a business may not engage in the practice of medicine by employing licensed 
physicians.”). 
181 See Hadfield, supra note 3 (manuscript at 17) (“[M]ost state courts assert their right to 
independently, if not exclusively, regulate the legal profession and as we have seen, caselaw 
states that the doctrine is judicial not legislative in origin.”); e.g., Beyers v. Richmond, 937 
A.2d 1082, 1089 (Pa. 2007) (“Any legislative enactment encroaching upon this Court’s 
exclusive power to regulate attorney conduct would be unconstitutional.”); Bennion, Van 
Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 736 (Wash. 1981) (“Since the 
regulation of the practice of law is within the sole province of the judiciary, encroachment 
by the legislature may be held by this court to violate the separation of powers doctrine.”).  
182 See Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third & Fourth 
Departmentts, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, 488 F. 
App’x 526, 527 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The district court held that plaintiffs’ injury could not be 
redressed by invalidation of Rule 5.4 because other provisions of New York state law, the 
constitutionality of which plaintiffs specifically declined to challenge, independently and 
unambiguously prohibit non-lawyer investment in law firms and would continue to prohibit 
them from accepting non-lawyer equity investors even if Rule 5.4 were struck down.”). 
183 Id. at 527 (“The district court concluded that, in light of the multiple laws prohibiting 
plaintiffs’ proposed conduct, any ruling it might issue regarding Rule 5.4 would be merely 
advisory.”). 
184 Id. (remanding to permit amendment to the complaint so that all provisions of state 
law prohibiting nonlawyer investment are challenged). 
185 Id. (“At oral argument, Jacoby & Meyers confirmed that it had declined to challenge 
the other provisions of New York state law out of a concern that the district court, relying on 
uncertainty about the meaning of state law, would abstain from deciding the case . . . .” 
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then any challenge to the ethics rule would be merely advisory, as long as the 
statute prohibited the same conduct.186 The Second Circuit resolved the 
dilemma by accepting the State’s assertion that the statute should in fact be 
interpreted to prohibit corporate practice, and concluded that the State would 
therefore be judicially estopped from arguing in favor of Pullman abstention, 
paving the way for the district court to consider the challenge on its merits 
after remand.187 
A. A Rational Basis? 
Given the political difficulties inherent in eradicating corporate practice 
restrictions, it is not surprising that opponents would turn to constitutional 
arguments.188 The corporate practice doctrine remains something of a 
“zombie” legal rule at the current time.189 Almost no one believes that it serves 
a legitimate policy purpose,190 but it remains propped up by rent-seeking 
individuals who are loath to give up regulations protecting them from 
competition.191 And killing part of the doctrine does nothing to stop the 
remaining pieces from creating mischief;192 instead, the doctrine has a way of 
 
(citing R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941))). 
186 Id. (“The district court concluded that, in light of the multiple laws prohibiting 
plaintiffs’ proposed conduct, any ruling it might issue regarding Rule 5.4 would be merely 
advisory.”). 
187 Id. (“Because the district court and appellees agree that Judiciary Law § 495 and LLC 
Law § 201, as authoritatively interpreted by the state courts; unambiguously prohibit non-
lawyer investment in law firms, Pullman abstention is unnecessary, and the district court 
can proceed to adjudicate the parties’ dispute as to whether those statutes, and Rule 5.4, are 
constitutional.”). 
188 See id. 
189 See, e.g., Daniel R. Shulman, Refusals to Deal: Is Anything Left; Should There Be?, 
11 SEDONA CONF. J. 95, 111 (2010) (defining a “zombie doctrine” as one that “even though 
it should be dead, . . . keeps on coming”). 
190 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (making the case that the primary goals 
of the corporate practice doctrine are economic protectionism and a misguided attempt to 
protect clients); see also Matthew W. Bish, Revising Model Rule 5.4: Adopting a Regulatory 
Scheme that Permits Nonlawyer Ownership and Management of Law Firms, 48 WASHBURN 
L.J. 669, 694 (2009) (“[A] law firm’s goal of making profit and its duty to provide 
competent, ethical representation to its clients are not in opposition to each other; a law firm 
can only maximize its profits by providing competent, quality, ethical representation.”); 
Rhode, supra note 160, at 99 (“Absent evidence of significant injury resulting from lay 
assistance, individuals should be entitled to determine the cost and quality of legal services 
that best meet their needs. Where there are demonstrable grounds for paternalism, it should 
emanate from institutions other than the organized bar.”). 
191 See supra Part II (arguing that the corporate practice doctrine keeps legal fee rates 
prohibitively high for middle class consumers). 
192 See supra text accompanying notes 183-86 (describing the difficulty in assailing a 
doctrine comprised of both statutes and regulations, which can neither be adequately 
attacked together or apart for procedural and practical reasons). 
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springing back into life after being pronounced dead.193 A successful 
constitutional challenge, however, would decapitate the doctrine, successfully 
eradicating it once and for all, in both medicine and law.194 Such a 
constitutional challenge presents an uphill battle under current doctrine, but it 
is a battle worth fighting. 
Under the Supreme Court’s “freedom of contract” jurisprudence of the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the case against the corporate practice 
doctrine might have gained traction had a challenge been brought at that time. 
The legal conception of freedom of contract arose in England with the growth 
of laissez faire economics, and migrated from there into British and U.S. 
law.195 By the early part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court had held 
that “the right to contract about one’s affairs is a part of the liberty of the 
individual protected by [the Due Process Clause], is settled by the decisions of 
this Court and is no longer open to question.”196 During this period, however, 
the Court was criticized for going too far with the freedom of contract doctrine, 
especially to the extent that the Court struck down labor legislation perceived 
as beneficial to the working class and important to improving industrial 
conditions.197 Lochner v. New York,198 in which the Court struck down a state 
statute limiting work hours for bakery employees, became emblematic of the 
Court’s freedom of contract jurisprudence.199 
 
193 Huberfeld, supra note 3, at 253 (“While the doctrine may seem too outdated to be 
enforced, the statutes and regulations that form the doctrine remain in current statutory 
compilations and, like a sleeping dragon, need only a slight stimulus to be set into action.”). 
194 Cf. Erik Henrickson, How to Kill a Zombie, PORTLAND MERCURY (Sept. 16, 2004), 
http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/how-to-kill-a-zombie/Content?oid=32136 (“To 
kill zombies, you need to destroy their brains. The most surefire route is simply lopping off 
the cranium . . . . [A]nything less than 100 percent severance just isn’t good enough.”). 
195 P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 294 (1979) (“The fact is 
that the concept of freedom of contract was at the very heart of classical economics, and 
there is good ground for thinking that the common lawyers may have taken over the concept 
from the economists in the early part of the nineteenth century.”); see also Martin J. Doris, 
Did We Lose the Baby with the Bath Water? The Late Scholastic Contribution to the 
Common Law of Contracts, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 361, 361 (2005) (“Common law 
opinion, in particular, has almost universally accepted that the emergence of the doctrine of 
freedom of contract in English law is owed much to the dominance of classical liberalism 
and laissez-faire economics in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.”). 
196 Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) (citations omitted). 
197 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 474 (1909) (“After 1900, the 
pendulum had clearly begun to swing the other way. But there are a number of striking 
decisions taking extreme views as to liberty of contract prior to the Adair case.” (discussing 
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908))).  
198 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (“Under such circumstances the 
freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in relation to their employment, 
and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violating the 
Federal Constitution.”). 
199 BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 1 (“Lochner is likely the most disreputable case in 
  
214 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:179 
 
In the 1930s, the Court became more willing to uphold state labor 
regulations, signaling a new direction in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 
which overruled earlier precedent and upheld a state act establishing a 
minimum wage for female employees.200 The Court’s jurisprudential shift 
arrived just as professional licensing was growing and corporate practice 
restrictions were arriving in the wake of licensing laws.201 In changing 
directions on freedom of contract, the Court swung the pendulum to its 
opposite extreme.202 Under the framework of rational basis review, the Court 
became willing to uphold state economic regulations on the most tenuous 
grounds – even when there was no evidence of the effectiveness of the 
regulation, as when Oklahoma refused to allow nonmedical professionals to fit 
new frames for pre-existing eyeglass lenses,203 or when Kansas prohibited 
anyone but a licensed attorney from negotiating with creditors for debt 
reduction.204 In contrast to its earlier freedom of contract jurisprudence, the 
Court now took an entirely hands-off position with regard to economic 
regulation, stating that it “refuse[d] to sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the 
wisdom of legislation,’”205 and “emphatically refuse[d] to go back to the time 
when courts used the Due Process Clause ‘to strike down state laws, regulatory 
of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, 
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.’”206 Thus, 
even a law enacted for overtly protectionist purposes would not be struck 
down.207 
 
modern constitutional discourse.”); Pound, supra note 197, at 479 (describing the Lochner 
opinion as “the reactionary view” of “a bare majority” of the Court). 
200 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“The Constitution does 
not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty 
without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not 
recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.”). 
201 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (estimating that the doctrine arose in 
both the medical and legal professions around 1928). 
202 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 103 (“Debate has raged among historians as to 
whether West Coast Hotel marked an abrupt break with the past, or whether the Court 
simply chose to follow the more liberal precedents regarding the police power’s scope. . . . 
Regardless, it seems reasonably clear that as of 1937 there were not yet five votes to 
completely abandon liberty of contract.”). 
203 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
204 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (“It is now settled that States ‘have 
power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal 
commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific 
federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law.’” (quoting Lincoln Fed. 
Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949))). 
205 Id. at 731 (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)). 
206 Id. at 731-32 (quoting Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488). 
207 Id. at 732 (“Statutes create many classifications which do not deny equal protection; it 
is only ‘invidious discrimination’ which offends the Constitution.”). 
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The corporate practice doctrine survived the Supreme Court’s review in the 
1930s because it protected the profession against “unseemly rivalry” – a 
sufficient basis even under the stricter rational basis review of the Lochner 
era.208 In later years, other protectionist laws that were adopted at the same 
time, and with the same goals as the corporate practice doctrine (most notably 
the prohibitions on professional advertising), were subsequently struck down 
on First Amendment grounds.209 The corporate practice doctrine, however, 
remained in play. Unlike the advertising restrictions that had to stand up to 
heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment, the corporate practice 
doctrine merely had to survive under the lower rational basis standard, and by 
this era, the courts applied that standard exceedingly deferentially.210 As 
scholars have pointed out, the Supreme Court was then willing to uphold 
legislative action as long as “there was any rational thought conceivable behind 
the law – even if it was not actually on the minds of most of the legislators who 
voted for it.”211 Under this extraordinarily deferential standard, almost any law 
would be upheld.212 So the corporate practice restrictions that were originally 
intended to prevent the same “unseemly rivalry” as advertising prohibitions 
could now be upheld on the basis that they might protect the public from 
harmful professional services.213 
Nevertheless, some have suggested that the Court’s extreme deference in 
rational basis review has reached its outer limits and have posited that there are 
signs the Court may be willing to inquire into the “rationality” of legislation a 
bit more skeptically.214 In fact, in a few cases in subsequent decades, the Court 
 
208 Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 611-12 (1935) (“We have 
held that the state may deny to corporations the right to practice, insisting upon the personal 
obligations of individuals and that it may prohibit advertising that tends to mislead the 
public in this respect . . . the community is concerned in providing safeguards not only 
against deception, but against practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by 
forcing its members into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the 
least scrupulous.” (citing Miller v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Colo., 287 U.S. 563 
(1932))). 
209 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). 
210 Id. at 368-79; Semler, 294 U.S. at 611. 
211 Elizabeth Price Foley, Judicial Engagement, Written Constitutions, and the Value of 
Preservation: The Case of Individual Rights, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 909, 921 (2012). 
212 U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“Where, as here, there are 
plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, 
‘constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision . . 
. .’” (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960))). 
213 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“It is enough that 
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular 
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”). 
214 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 679 (3d ed. 
2006) (“[I]t also can be argued that the Court has gone too far in its deference under the 
rational basis test. Unfair laws are allowed to stand because a conceivable legitimate 
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has actually struck down legislation even under a rational basis standard,215 
including a state licensing decision excluding former members of the 
Communist Party from the practice of law.216 Others, however, have suggested 
that such review is not a sign of retrenchment, but rather a moderately 
heightened standard to be applied in cases of political or social animus.217 
The question of how much “bite” to give rational basis review took a central 
position in the argument over the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA) in United States v. Windsor.218 The district court concluded that 
“the rational basis analysis can vary by context,” with “a more searching form” 
 
purpose can be identified for virtually any law.”); Sandefur, supra note 11, at 487 (“But as 
Romer, Cleburne, and similar cases have demonstrated, a realistic rationality review need 
not intrude upon the abilities of legislatures to make legitimate policies.”); see also Hettinga 
v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 482-83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, C.J., concurring) (“The 
practical effect of rational basis review of economic regulation is the absence of any check 
on the group interests that all too often control the democratic process. . . . Rational basis 
review means property is at the mercy of the pillagers. The constitutional guarantee of 
liberty deserves more respect—a lot more.”).  
215 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (striking down a law prohibiting local 
governments from including sexual orientation as a protected category in antidiscrimination 
laws, and finding the ostensible purpose of the legislation to be “so far removed” from the 
“breadth of the amendment” that it was “impossible to credit them”); City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (striking down a zoning law that excluded 
group homes for individuals with developmental disabilities, and emphasizing that even 
under rational basis review, “[t]he State may not rely on a classification whose relationship 
to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational”); 
Metro. Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985) (striking down a discriminatory tax on 
insurance companies). 
216 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1957) (“There is no 
evidence in the record which rationally justifies a finding that Schware was morally unfit to 
practice law.”). 
217 Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 937 
(2012). The Obama Administration, in a recent Supreme Court brief, referred to this idea as 
rational basis review “with added focus” in order to distinguish it from the traditional notion 
of heightened scrutiny. Even here, however, the Administration limited the role of “added 
focus” to cases involving animus against politically disfavored groups. Brief for the United 
States on the Merits Question at 52-54, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) 
(No. 12-307), 2013 WL 683048 (“[T]he history of discrimination and the absence of 
relation to one’s capabilities associated with this particular classification would uniquely 
qualify it for scrutiny under an approach that calls for a measure of added focus to guard 
against giving effect to a desire to harm an ‘unpopular group.’” Id. at 53). 
218 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (“DOMA, because of its reach and extent, departs from 
this history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage. ‘[D]iscriminations of an 
unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are 
obnoxious to the constitutional provision.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 
(1996))); see Nancy C. Marcus, “Argle Bargle,”or Deeply-Rooted Principles of Equal 
Liberty? The Inevitability of Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 
(forthcoming 2014).  
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applied in cases of animus against the politically disfavored, and a more 
deferential form in cases involving economic or regulatory issues.219 On 
appeal, the Second Circuit held that heightened scrutiny applied and provided 
an alternate basis to strike down the law, which allowed the court to avoid 
deciding whether the district court correctly applied the more stringent version 
of the rational basis test.220 The Second Circuit expressed gratitude for the 
escape valve, observing that “fortunately” it need not decide which formulation 
of rational basis review to apply, an area that the court found was subject to 
“doctrinal instability,” as the Supreme Court had never “expressly sanctioned 
such modulation in the level of rational basis review.”221 
In its decision in Windsor, the Supreme Court did not eliminate this 
“doctrinal instability.”222 As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, “[t]he 
opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even mention what had been the 
central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, 
laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than 
mere rationality.”223 The Court did, however, appear to invoke the rational 
basis standard in striking down the federal ban on same sex marriage: the 
Court held that “no legitimate purpose” supported the statute in light of the fact 
that DOMA was intended to “disparage and to injure those whom the State, by 
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”224 Thus, the 
Court appeared to weigh the statute’s reported animus in its analysis of a 
legitimate purpose; the existence of such animus perhaps reduced the 
deference the Court was willing to give to the legislative purpose, even under 
the rational basis standard.225 
Although dealing with a challenge to a very different statute, the Supreme 
Court in Windsor appeared to extend the rational basis test that it had earlier 
applied in Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Ward, where the Court struck down 
an Alabama statute that charged out-of-state insurance companies higher tax 
 
219 Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 699 F.3d 
169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
220 Windsor, 699 F.3d at 180-81, aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (“The Supreme Court has 
not expressly sanctioned such modulation in the level of rational basis review; discussion 
pro and con has largely been confined to concurring and dissenting opinions. We think it is 
safe to say that there is some doctrinal instability in this area. Fortunately, no permutation of 
rational basis review is needed if heightened scrutiny is available, as it is in this case. We 
therefore decline to join issue with the dissent, which explains why Section 3 of DOMA 
may withstand rational basis review.”). 
221 Id. 
222 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692, 2696 (asserting that DOMA requires “careful 
consideration” while simultaneously inquiring whether the law serves a “legitimate 
purpose,” the language of traditional rational basis review). 
223 Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
224 Id. at 2696. 
225 Id. 
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rates than in-state companies.226 In Ward, the Court likewise found that there 
was “no legitimate state purpose” that could counteract the discriminatory 
nature of the tax.227 As in Windsor, the Court in Ward appeared to weigh the 
policy interests advanced by the government against the discriminatory means 
employed: thus, while encouraging in-state capital investment might be a 
legitimate state purpose in a vacuum, it would not be a legitimate state purpose 
“when furthered by discrimination.”228 
Justice O’Connor dissented in Ward, stating that she found the Court’s 
holding “astonishing” and “threatening [to] the freedom of both state and 
federal legislative bodies to fashion appropriate classifications in economic 
legislation.”229 She criticized the Court’s decision for “collapsing the two 
prongs of the rational basis test into one” and thereby avoiding the need to 
“engag[e] in the deferential inquiry we have adopted as a brake on judicial 
impeachment of legislative policy choices.”230 Justice O’Connor was right that 
the Court had merged the two prongs of the rational basis test into a single 
scale, and right that by merging the two, the Court was able to apply a stricter 
version of the rational basis test than it had in earlier decades.231 Nearly three 
decades later, Justice Scalia made a similar point in his Windsor dissent, 
stating: 
I would review this classification only for its rationality. As nearly as I 
can tell, the Court agrees with that; its opinion does not apply strict 
scrutiny, and its central propositions are taken from rational-basis cases 
like Moreno. But the Court certainly does not apply anything that 
resembles that deferential framework.232 
Both Ward and Windsor suggest that the Court may be applying a rational 
basis test that is less deferential than the one it applied in Lee Optical, and one 
that allows the legitimacy of the state’s purpose to be evaluated in the context 
of the facts at hand, not merely in a hypothetical vacuum. Thus, the purpose of 
 
226 Metro. Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985) (assessing whether the state law 
served a “legitimate” purpose, while investigating the proffered purposes at length, 
suggesting a less deferential approach than that employed in traditional rational basis 
review). 
227 Id. (“We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by the Alabama 
domestic preference tax statute . . . is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause to justify 
the imposition of the discriminatory tax at issue here.”). 
228 Id. at 882. 
229 Id. at 883 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
230 Id. at 898. 
231 Id. at 884 (“Our precedents impose a heavy burden on those who challenge local 
economic regulation solely on Equal Protection Clause grounds. In this context, our long-
established jurisprudence requires us to defer to a legislature’s judgment if the classification 
is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.”). 
232 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted).  
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ensuring uniformity in the definition of marriage might be a legitimate 
legislative purpose – but not when motivated by malice and discriminatory 
motivations. Likewise, protecting capital investment could be a legitimate state 
purpose – but not when motivated by a desire to discriminate against out-of-
state businesses. Such a contextual test also finds support in Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Kelo v. City of New London, where he wrote: 
A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause 
should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor 
a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public 
benefits, just as a court applying rational-basis review under the Equal 
Protection Clause must strike down a government classification that is 
clearly intended to injure a particular class of private parties, with only 
incidental or pretextual public justifications.233 
For Justice Kennedy in Kelo, and for the Court in Ward and Windsor, context 
is important: what might be a legitimate state interest in the abstract may not 
be a legitimate state interest in a particular context of discrimination. 
Thus, context matters in rationality review.234 But what are the limits of this 
doctrine? What counts as a discriminatory or improper motive sufficient to 
overcome an otherwise legitimate state purpose? These questions are 
paramount in the so-called “economic liberty” cases,235 where a recent circuit 
 
233 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
234 Although the importance of a fact-based contextual analysis has often been 
overlooked in rational basis review, the idea is not a new one. The Supreme Court 
advocated this approach in a 1938 decision: 
[U]nder the burden of proof favored by Justice Harlan and adopted by Justice Brandeis, 
it was still permissible for a person to challenge a legislative restriction on liberty by 
showing that it was unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory. This was made 
abundantly clear by the New Deal Court in the landmark 1938 case of United States v. 
Carolene Products Co. Although this case is known for the most famous footnote in 
the history of the Supreme Court—the celebrated Footnote Four—in the less well-
studied body of the case, Justice Stone reaffirmed judicial scrutiny of the 
reasonableness of a statute was still available. “Where the existence of a rational basis 
for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere 
of judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry, and 
the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of 
facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist.” 
See Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks: Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee 
Optical, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845, 849 (2012) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938)). 
235 Roger V. Abbott, Is Economic Protectionism a Legitimate Governmental Interest 
Under Rational Basis Review?, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, 501 (2013) (“[M]any licensing 
laws not only curb competition, but also stunt social mobility. Licensing regulations are 
particularly harmful to low-income workers who have the requisite skills to compete, but 
lack either formal training or financial resources to meet the onerous licensure 
requirements.” (footnote omitted)); Marc P. Florman, Comment, The Harmless Pursuit of 
Happiness: Why “Rational Basis with Bite” Review Makes Sense for Challenges to 
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split regarding casket-sale restrictions provides an excellent test case to give 
shape to this contextual rational basis test. 
A number of states have restricted casket sales to licensed mortuary 
professionals; like other protectionist practices, however, this restriction raises 
prices and proponents offer no evidence that the public suffers any actual harm 
by an open market for caskets.236 Nevertheless, circuit courts adopted different 
positions representing the two views of rational basis review. 
The Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles v. Giles affirmed a decision striking down 
Tennessee’s restriction on casket sales to licensed funeral directors.237 The 
court took care to distinguish its holding from Lochner’s more stringent review 
of economic regulations.238 Nevertheless, the court found that each of the 
Government’s proffered defenses of the measure failed a rational basis review. 
The court first concluded that “protecting a discrete interest group from 
economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.”239 Then, 
turning to the State’s consumer protection rationales, the court rejected 
arguments that licensing vendors would improve the quality and safety of the 
caskets themselves; the court noted that the State could certainly regulate 
 
Occupational Licenses, 58 LOY. L. REV. 721, 758 (2012) (“While there are many good 
arguments in support of the use of rational basis with bite review whenever any economic 
regulation enacted under the state police power is challenged, this comment takes a much 
narrower position: that occupational licensing statutes (i.e., regulations that infringe on the 
specific part of economic liberty that encompasses the right to pursue one’s chosen 
profession) should be subjected to rational basis with bite review.”). 
236 Lana Harfoush, Comment, Grave Consequences for Economic Liberty: The Funeral 
Industry’s Protectionist Occupational Licensing Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why It 
Matters, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135, 159 (2011) (“Those occupational licensing 
laws are based upon a meritless ‘because I said so’ justification. This helps a select few, but 
leaves many hardworking, honest entrepreneurs, who labor in harmless occupations, out in 
the cold. The circuit split that exists today provides some hope that purely protectionist 
occupational licenses will not stand.”); Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation 
Through Burial: How Challenging Casket Regulations Helped Unearth Economic 
Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668, 687 (2004) 
(“Testimony was taken at trial in Craigmiles that a leaky casket could pose a threat to public 
health, but in practice that threat is nonexistent. . . . Caskets are not even meant to protect 
health and safety. The very concept of an ‘unsafe casket’ is a hollow one.”).  
237 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a licensure 
requirement designed for a funeral directors’ application to an independent casket retailer 
was not rationally related to any legitimate government purpose, therefore violating both 
equal protection and due process, and further holding that protection of discrete interests 
from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose). 
238 Id. (“Our decision today is not a return to Lochner, by which this court would elevate 
its economic theory over that of legislative bodies . . . no sophisticated economic analysis is 
required to see the pretextual nature of the state’s proffered explanations for the 1972 
amendment.”). 
239 Id. at 224 (“[P]rotecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a 
legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
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casket quality directly – in the absence of such regulation, allowing 
competition for casket sales would be more likely to raise quality relative to 
price.240 Additionally, while the State had argued that “the course of study 
required for licensure trains directors in the best ways to treat individuals who 
have suffered profound loss,” and therefore “[u]nlicensed casket retailers, 
without this psychological training . . . may aggravate the grief of the 
decedent’s survivors who are shopping for a casket,”241 the court disagreed. 
Instead, it concluded that consumers would still deal with trained funeral 
directors for mortuary services, thus receiving the benefit of their training, but 
would also deal with “panoply” of unlicensed vendors for other services.242 
Thus, the court concluded that the measure “privilege[d] certain businessmen 
over others at the expense of consumers,” was “not animated by a legitimate 
governmental purpose,” and therefore “cannot survive even rational basis 
review.”243 
The Tenth Circuit applied a more deferential standard of review in Powers 
v. Harris,244 and consequently upheld Oklahoma’s casket law.245 Interestingly, 
the court’s most fundamental disagreement with Craigmiles arose from the 
question of whether pure protectionism could constitute a legitimate state 
interest; while the Sixth Circuit had rejected that proposition, the Tenth Circuit 
was willing to accept it.246 The court concluded that the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence allowed protectionism as long as it merely favored one industry 
over another without burdening interstate commerce, and concluded that 
“while baseball may be the national pastime of the citizenry, dishing out 
special economic benefits to certain in-state industries remains the favored 
pastime of state and local governments.”247 The court therefore held that 
“[b]ecause we find that intra-state economic protectionism, absent a violation 
of a specific federal statutory or constitutional provision, is a legitimate state 
 
240 Id. at 226 (“Generally, however, the cost of more protective caskets is higher . . . [i]f 
casket retailers were to increase competition on casket prices and bring those prices closer 
to marginal costs, then more protective caskets would become more affordable for 
consumers with limited funds and their use would likely increase.”). 
241 Id. at 228. 
242 Id. (“Moreover, survivors must deal with a panoply of vendors in order to make 
funeral arrangements, from churches to food vendors for a wake, none of whom is required 
to have this psychological training. This justification is very weak, indeed.”). 
243 Id. at 229. 
244 Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004). 
245 Id. at 1225 (“Because we hold that intrastate economic protectionism, absent a 
violation of a specific federal statutory or constitutional provision, is a legitimate state 
interest and that the [statute] is rationally related to this legitimate end, we AFFIRM.”).  
246 Id. at 1218-19 (“Because the four Supreme Court cases cited in Craigmiles and 
Santos do not stand for the proposition that intrastate economic protectionism, absent a 
violation of a specific constitutional provision of federal statute, is an illegitimate state 
interest, we cannot agree [that such protectionism is illegitimate].”). 
247 Id. at 1219-21. 
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interest, we have little difficulty determining that the [statute] satisfies rational 
basis review.”248 Finally, though the protectionism argument was dispositive, 
the court also expressed approval of the State’s hypothetical consumer 
protection rationale249 in spite of the fact that, as in Craigmiles, the evidence 
contradicted the assertion of actual improvement in consumer welfare.250 
More recently, after considering the split between the Sixth and Tenth 
Circuits, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Craigmiles was correct in concluding that mere economic protectionism could 
not be a legitimate government interest, as it would be “a naked transfer of 
wealth.”251 Nevertheless, the court concluded that under the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lee Optical, even a policy founded on economic protectionism 
would be constitutionally permissible if “supported by a post hoc perceived 
rationale.”252 The court therefore concluded that casket-sale restrictions should 
be upheld only if the state could show a rational basis for such restrictions that 
was “not plainly refuted . . . on the record compiled by the district court at 
trial.”253 After examining the evidence presented at trial, the court affirmed the 
district court’s decision to strike down the regulation; it agreed with the district 
court’s findings that the facts belied the post hoc rationales proffered by the 
State.254 For example, the State argued that the law could be justified by its 
protection of consumer interests, but the court concluded that the undisputed 
facts demonstrated that the exclusive-sale provision “adds nothing to protect 
consumers and puts them at a greater risk of abuse including exploitive 
prices.”255 Likewise, the court concluded that the State’s health-and-safety 
rationale to limit casket sales was contradicted by the State’s failure to require 
caskets for burial and failure to place any requirements on the design or 
construction of caskets.256 The court concluded that both consumer protection 
 
248 Id. at 1222. 
249 Id. at 1227 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“[T]he district court did not err in crediting 
the consumer protection rationale advanced by the Board.”). 
250 Id. (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the evidence showed that 
“[c]onsumer interests appear to be harmed rather than protected by the limitation of choice 
and price encouraged by the licensing restrictions on intrastate casket sales”). 
251 St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222-23 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 423 (2013) (“[N]either precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere economic 
protection of a particular industry is a legitimate governmental purpose, but economic 
protection, that is favoritism, may well be supported by a post hoc perceived rationale . . . 
without which it is aptly described as a naked transfer of wealth.”). 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 223. 
254 Id. at 226 (“That grant of an exclusive right of sale adds nothing to protect consumers 
and puts them at a greater risk of abuse including exploitative prices.”). 
255 Id. 
256 Id. (“That Louisiana does not even require a casket for burial, does not impose 
requirements for their construction or design, does not require a casket to be sealed before 
burial, and does not require funeral directors to have any special expertise in caskets leads 
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and health and safety could justify state regulation of caskets in theory, but the 
record developed in the trial court negated the possibility that either 
consideration was actually related to the regulation in question.257 
Thus, there is a split of authority over questions of rational basis review 
relevant to the corporate practice doctrine, including whether economic 
protectionism is a legitimate state interest,258 what kind of showing is 
necessary to negate a hypothetical state interest,259 and whether a purported 
rational basis can be overcome by countervailing “evidence of irrationality.”260 
If the Supreme Court ultimately sides with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation on 
either of the first two counts – or accepts the Fifth Circuit’s invitation to allow 
evidentiary development as in the third – then economic liberty cases may 
receive greater attention, and economic liberties would receive greater 
protection.261 Regardless of how the tea leaves should be read, it is apparent 
 
us to conclude that no rational relationship exists between public health and safety and 
limiting intrastate sales of caskets to funeral establishments.”). 
257 Id. at 227. 
258 See, e.g., Katharine M. Rudish, Unearthing the Public Interest: Recognizing 
Intrastate Economic Protectionism as a Legitimate State Interest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1485, 1530 (2012) (“Making it unconstitutional for a state to protect a particular industry 
through regulation goes against the federalism and judicial-activism concerns underpinning 
the Court’s economic substantive due process jurisprudence since the demise of Lochner.”); 
Florman, supra note 235, at 734 (“[The Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles] reasoned that because 
‘protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate 
governmental purpose,’ the occupational licensing requirements were unconstitutional, as 
applied to the plaintiff casket retailers. The Tenth Circuit in Powers disagreed.”). 
259 Sanders, supra note 236, at 692-94 (“This failure of the Craigmiles court to 
emphasize the irrelevance of the licensing standards pertains to criticism of Craigmiles in 
Powers v. Harris. In that case . . . [t]he district judge critiqued Craigmiles, stating that the 
Sixth Circuit used policy arguments in striking down the licensing restrictions. Policy 
arguments are not allowed under the rational basis test, argued the court, so the Sixth Circuit 
[in Craigmiles] went beyond its authority in weighing the pros and cons of licensing versus 
increased competition in the casket market.” (citations omitted)); see also Harfoush, supra 
note 236, at 159. 
260 Castille, 712 F.3d at 223 (“[A]lthough rational basis review places no affirmative 
evidentiary burden on the government, plaintiffs may nonetheless negate a seemingly 
plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence of irrationality.”). Although the Castille 
court’s use of the phrase “evidence of irrationality” suggests that an evidentiary hearing 
could be a proper means of negating possible state interests, the Supreme Court has 
historically discouraged evidentiary proceedings. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 
508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (“[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding 
and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”). 
261 Ezra B. Hood, Interpreting in the Public Interest: How Macey’s Canon Can Restore 
Economic Liberty, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 441, 476-77 (2009) (“Where a court gives 
so much deference to a majoritarian legislature that even made up rationales for liberty-
restricting laws are acceptable, the only check remaining on that legislature are the politics 
by which it is elected. . . . However, public choice theory’s insight into how collective 
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that the Supreme Court will need to decide the limits of rational basis review. 
The corporate practice doctrine provides a good vehicle to test whether the 
Court would be willing to retreat from the most extreme version of the rational 
basis test. 
Moving away from the more extreme forms of deference that the Court has 
applied in the last few decades would require at most a change in 
interpretation, but not a change in the nominal standard. Even if it applied the 
“old-school” rule of rational basis review that invalidated only arbitrary and 
irrational legislation, the Court could still require “a real and substantial 
relation to the object sought to be attained,” and to the means of attaining it.262 
If the Court is serious about requiring such a “real and substantial relation,” 
the corporate practice doctrine should not stand. One scholar has analyzed the 
factors that might go into such an evaluation, suggesting striking the law down 
under a rational basis test if some or all of the following conditions are met: 
[E]vidence of an intent to benefit one group of people at the expense of 
others, i.e., protectionism; evidence refuting the law’s ostensible public-
interest rationale; the presence of less restrictive alternatives to satisfy the 
law’s ostensible purpose; evidence showing a harm to competition and 
consumers; and, perhaps, evidence that the law may interfere with 
interstate commerce.263 
These factors bear similarities to the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Craigmiles, 
as the court found that the casket-sale restrictions arose from protectionism, 
that the restriction caused consumer and commercial harm by raising prices, 
and that the evidence suggested that any hypothetical consumer protection 
benefits had failed to materialize in practice.264 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has 
agreed that evidence countering the state’s hypothetical rationale can “negate a 
seemingly plausible basis” for the law, observing that “a hypothetical rationale, 
even post hoc, cannot be fantasy.”265 These factors provide a useful lens for 
 
majorities actually function gives solemn warning about how poorly majoritarian 
legislatures might be trusted truly to express the public interest.”). 
262 Foley, supra note 211, at 928 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nebbia v. 
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934)). 
263 Asheesh Agarwal, Protectionism as a Rational Basis? The Impact on E-Commerce in 
the Funeral Industry, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 189, 213 (2007) (footnote omitted).  
264 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002). 
265 St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 700 F.3d 154, 162 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e question 
whether [the rationale offered] is betrayed by the undisputed facts as pretextual.”); see also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1706-
07 (1984) (suggesting that the requirement for a rational basis “‘filters out’ illegitimate 
motivations,” so that “[w]hen the asserted benefits turn out to be illusory, or are minimal in 
relation to the burdens imposed, there is good reason to suspect that an illegitimate 
motivation – something other than the asserted benefits – in fact accounts for the 
regulation”). 
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applying the contextual type of rational basis review that the Court endorsed in 
Ward and Windsor.266 
Applying these five elements to the corporate practice doctrine likewise 
suggests that the restrictions on outside investment should be struck down, and 
that the Supreme Court should recognize a right to contract within the market 
for professional services. First, even if protectionist intent was not clear at the 
time the doctrine was first adopted, it is certainly apparent in the failure of later 
attempts to repeal the doctrine.267 In spite of warnings from the FTC as to the 
anticompetitive nature of the restrictions, and in spite of various committee 
proposals to permit outside investment, lawyers overwhelmingly expressed a 
fear of competition from outside parties and thus chose to retain the rule nearly 
every time the issue came up.268 Likewise, the medical profession did not drop 
the national rule until it was forced to after losing the FTC’s law suit; even 
afterward, a number of states continued to prohibit physicians from accepting 
employment with corporate entities.269 
Similarly, evidence contrary to the stated public interest rationale and 
evidence showing harm to consumers are both apparent as well; there is ample 
evidence that the doctrine raises prices and decreases access to legal and 
medical services, and there is no countervailing evidence that it increases the 
quality of services rendered.270 And, as in the casket cases, there are a number 
of less restrictive ways to achieve the same ends. To the extent that the state is 
interested in ensuring independent judgment, it can regulate that directly by 
prohibiting outside investors from interfering with professional care.271 The 
 
266 See supra notes 218-35 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s approach in Windsor, where 
it “extend[ed] the rational-basis test that it had earlier applied in Metropolitan Life 
Insurance v. Ward, in which the Court struck down an Alabama statute that charged out-of-
state insurance companies higher tax rates than in-state companies”). 
267 See supra Parts I & II. 
268 See supra Parts I & II. The FTC brought suit against the AMA, after which the AMA 
dropped its corporate practice restrictions. The bar rebuffed pressure from the FTC and an 
ABA Commission, as well as proposals to liberalize the ABA’s rules and align them more 
closely with the District of Columbia’s, which would have allowed for limited investment 
by private individuals in firms providing exclusively legal services. 
269 See supra Part I.A. 
270 See supra Parts II & III. 
271 See Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins., 703 N.W.2d 513, 524 (Minn. 2005) 
(“[T]he policy concerns underlying the doctrine-division of loyalty, conflict of interest, and 
the interference with and/or loss of independent, professional judgment-are more 
appropriately and accurately addressed through licensing laws, which can include 
requirements such as that health care providers use their independent judgment.”); Harris & 
Foran, supra note 2, at 836 (“The experience of the medical profession suggests that 
legitimate concerns over loss of professional autonomy to the detriment of clients can be 
adequately addressed through a combination of ethical rules and liability deterrents.”); Lisa 
Rediger Hayward, Revising Washington’s Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 71 
WASH. L. REV. 403, 430 (1996) (“Although the justifications for the doctrine were once 
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct already do this for conduct that is 
equally risky, but too common to prohibit; thus, for example, a lawyer may 
accept payment from a person other than the client (for example, the client’s 
employer, parent, or spouse could pay for legal services) – but in the case of a 
third-party payer, a lawyer is simply told that he or she “shall not permit” the 
payer “to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in the rendering 
of such services.”272 Finally, the corporate practice doctrine may well interfere 
with interstate commerce. Certainly, the healthcare market operates within the 
stream of interstate commerce,273 and recent trends toward globalization also 
help in erasing the importance of state barriers within the legal market.274 
Legal service providers such as LegalZoom and Law Pivot already operate 
across state borders; restricting their activity in an effort to promote 
independent solo practitioners would burden interstate commerce.275 Thus, the 
Court could (and should) easily conclude that although protecting the public 
from substandard legal advice and medical care is a legitimate state interest, 
the corporate practice doctrine offers no such protection. As a result, there is 
no legitimate state interest in discriminating against corporate ownership in the 
provision of professional services. 
B. The Case for Heightened Scrutiny 
As the prior Section argues, a rational basis challenge to the corporate 
practice doctrine will succeed only if the Supreme Court is willing to apply the 
test less deferentially than it has done in past decades.276 This is not 
impossible; there are signs that the Court may be willing to protect economic 
liberties somewhat more rigorously than it has for most of the last century, and 
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ approach to protectionist restrictions offers a 
guide for such a challenge.277 Nonetheless, such a challenge offers an uphill 
 
valid, they are presently addressed by other measures and hence, have lost their legitimacy 
in the new health care market. Modern regulations are available to protect the patient from 
the ‘quackery’ that the corporate prohibition once sought to avoid.”). 
272 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(c) (1983) (“A lawyers shall not permit a 
person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to 
direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal services.”). 
273 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (concluding that 
Congress’s commerce power did not authorize the Affordable Care Act’s mandate for 
people to buy health insurance, but nonetheless recognizing that the healthcare market itself 
is a useful part of interstate commerce). 
274 See supra Part II.B. 
275 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) (“[T]he Court has viewed with 
particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home 
State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a 
clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be 
virtually per se illegal.”). 
276 See supra Part IV.A. 
277 See supra Part IV.A. 
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battle: While it may be warranted, it would still be a significant divergence 
from prior jurisprudence for the Court to strike down a state law regulating 
professional practice. 
If there is a basis to examine the corporate practice doctrine under 
intermediate scrutiny, proponents of outside investment will have a much 
greater chance of success. As other scholars have noted, applying either 
rational basis review or strict scrutiny largely foretells the fate of the 
challenged restriction; by contrast, applying an intermediate standard 
“establishes a level playing field upon which conflicting state and private 
interests do battle,” allowing the Court “to balance the private and state 
interests involved with no clear rules detailing its approach.”278 
An argument can be made in favor of bringing the corporate practice 
doctrine within the scope of Carolene Products’ famous Footnote Four,279 and 
thus examining the corporate practice doctrine with a higher level of 
scrutiny.280 Forbidding physicians and attorneys from contracting for 
employment with corporate entities restricts their freedom of speech and 
freedom of association.281 The individual professionals cannot associate with 
whom they choose, and they cannot seek to propose a variety of potential 
commercial transactions for professional services. Likewise, corporations can 
neither offer professional services in the commercial marketplace nor 
communicate with clients about the possible benefits of selecting a particular 
professional for legal or medical advice – communications that could assist 
clients with retaining legal counsel or medical care of their choice.282 
 
278 Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro 
Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2808 (2005) (“Though descriptively vague, 
intermediate scrutiny becomes clearer when viewed conceptually in conjunction with the 
two alternative standards of review. If either rational basis review or strict scrutiny is 
applied, then the outcome of the case is virtually preordained.”). 
279 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be 
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation 
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of 
the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced 
within the Fourteenth.”). 
280 See Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis 
Test, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1101 (2013) (“[O]ccupational licensing is arguably the strongest 
candidate for heightened review under existing precedent.”). 
281 See Knake, supra note 3, at 10 (examining “the question of whether or not a 
corporation holds a First Amendment right to engage with lawyers for the purpose of 
delivering legal services (and, of course, whether or not an individual holds a corresponding 
interest in the delivery of those legal services)”). 
282 The right to retain a doctor or lawyer of one’s choice is part of an individual’s liberty 
interest. See Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 380 (Mont. 1999) (recognizing “the 
seriousness of the infringement of personal autonomy and privacy that accompanies the 
government usurping, through laws or regulations which dictate how and by whom a 
specific medical procedure is to be performed, the patient’s own informed health care 
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Under current jurisprudence, restrictions on the freedom of speech are 
scrutinized more highly than restrictions on the freedom of association; laws 
restricting freedom of association in the commercial realm are generally 
examined under the rational basis test, whereas laws restricting freedom of 
speech in the commercial realm are examined under an intermediate scrutiny 
standard.283 Traditionally, the intermediate scrutiny standard required the state 
to meet a four-part test to justify content-based restrictions: first, that the 
speech “concern[s] lawful activity and [is not] misleading”; second, that “the 
asserted governmental interest is substantial”; third, that “the regulation 
directly advances the governmental interest asserted”; and finally, that the 
restriction is “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”284 
Historically, the Supreme Court adopted a distinction between restrictions 
on speech that proposed a commercial transaction (which was protected under 
intermediate scrutiny) and “ordinary commercial or regulatory legislation that 
affects speech in less direct ways” (which was reviewed under a rational basis 
standard).285 But a pair of recent cases suggests that the Court may be moving 
toward providing heightened protection of regulations that infringe on speech 
rights; thus, even if the Court were willing to accept a “hypothetical” rational 
basis for regulatory action, it might require an evidence-based rational basis for 
regulatory action that infringes on speech.286 
 
decisions made in partnership with his or her chosen health care provider”); Jerold H. Israel, 
Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for 
Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 360 (2001) (“The denial of the 
opportunity to retain counsel was consistent with the settled usage in England, but not the 
settled usage in this country, where recognition of a fundamental right to the assistance of 
retained counsel of choice was widespread at the time of its founding.”). 
283 Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm 
Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 614 (1992) (“Under a First Amendment 
approach, the freedom of association theory is hampered by the possible application of a 
rational basis test of the legitimacy of the state’s regulatory scheme, while the commercial 
speech theory is generally understood to apply to advertising rather than other forms of 
conduct.”). 
284 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
285 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (“Expression concerning 
purely commercial transactions has come within the ambit of the [First] Amendment’s 
protection only recently. In rejecting the notion that such speech ‘is wholly outside the 
protection of the First Amendment,’ we were careful not to hold ‘that it is wholly 
undifferentiable from other forms’ of speech. We have not discarded the ‘common-sense’ 
distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area 
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.” (citations 
omitted)). 
286 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672 (majority opinion); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010) (“[C]ertain disfavored associations of citizens—those 
that have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the same political 
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In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Supreme Court struck down a Vermont law 
that forbade pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies from using 
prescription information for marketing purposes without the prescriber’s 
consent.287 Although the State had argued that the “sales, transfer, and use of 
prescriber-identifying information are conduct, not speech,” the Court easily 
concluded this restriction constituted a “specific, content-based burden on 
protected expression.”288 The harder question was whether it was a burden that 
could stand under the commercial speech doctrine.289 Here, the State argued 
that the law “advances important public policy goals by lowering the costs of 
medical services and promoting public health” by discouraging the marketing 
of more expensive brand-name medications when lower cost generic 
medications might be equally effective.290 The Court did not disagree that the 
State’s policy was a valid one, but it concluded that the goal was not strong 
enough to overcome the public interest in free and unfettered information; it 
stated that “the ‘fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful 
information’ cannot justify content-based burdens on speech.”291 Thus, the 
public’s interest in obtaining information trumped the State’s otherwise valid 
attempt to regulate the commercial marketplace. 
The second case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, likewise 
focused on the listener interest in unfettered expression.292 In addition, 
however, the Supreme Court added an admonition that “the Government may 
not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,” 
as “[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech 
of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”293 In Citizens United, the Supreme 
Court struck down a federal law restricting corporate campaign 
contributions.294 The Court concluded that restricting corporate speech 
infringed on the individual’s rights by “command[ing] where a person may get 
his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear,” and 
that in so doing, the government unlawfully “uses censorship to control 
thought,” as “[t]he First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for 
ourselves.”295 
 
speech . . . . This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for 
ourselves.”).  
287 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659 (“The State had burdened a form of protected expression 
that it found too persuasive. At the same time, the State has left unburdened those speakers 
whose messages are in accord with its own views. This the State cannot do.”). 
288 Id. at 2657, 2664. 
289 Id. at 2664. 
290 Id. at 2670. 
291 Id. at 2670-71 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)). 
292 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010). 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 372. 
295 Id. at 356 (“When the Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal 
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Professor Renee Knake has pointed out that Citizens United’s emphasis on 
allowing individuals to obtain information from the sources of their choice, 
whether corporate or individual, is inconsistent with current restrictions on the 
corporate practice of law.296 The Supreme Court’s unwillingness to distinguish 
between nonprofit and for-profit entities in Citizens United further strengthens 
the argument in favor of applying heightened scrutiny to the corporate practice 
doctrine; the Court had already struck down both an ethical rule that restricted 
nonprofit and political advocacy groups from offering legal services and a 
public funding restriction that prohibited funding recipients from challenging 
the validity of state and federal statutes.297 The same argument applies in the 
medical realm; Sorrell, after all, dealt with the public’s right to receive 
information relevant to their health and medical care.298 
In fact, Sorrell may provide an even stronger basis for exercising heightened 
scrutiny over corporate practice restrictions.299 By emphasizing that 
commercial speech is an important part of protecting the public’s access to 
information – and that the public’s right to information should not be restricted 
just because some people might use that information to make bad decisions – it 
evokes the interests at issue in the market for professional services. People’s 
right to legal and medical information is surely as strong as their right to 
receive information about pharmaceuticals; certainly the right to counsel is 
 
law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source 
he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First 
Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.”). 
296 Knake, supra note 3, at 36 (“[C]ommercial speech about the delivery of legal services 
is inherently political speech, speech that goes to the heart of meaningful access to the law, 
speech deserving of the strongest protection that the Constitution offers.”). 
297 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001) (striking down a 
restriction “prevent[ing] an attorney from arguing to a court that a state statute conflicts with 
a federal statute or that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its application is 
violative of the United States Constitution”); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-49 
(1963) (“We hold that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown on 
this record are modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the legal 
profession, as improper solicitation of legal business violative of Chapter 33 and the Canons 
of Professional Ethics.”); Knake, supra note 3, at 35-36 (“A word about Citizens United’s 
impact on commercial speech is also warranted here. Professor Randall Bezanson argues . . . 
‘it will be impossible in principle to treat commercial speech by corporations as anything 
less than fully protected speech.’”). 
298 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671-72 (2011) (“The State may not 
burden the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction. ‘The 
commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum 
where ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of 
slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, 
assess the value of the information presented.’” (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 
763 (1993))). 
299 Id.; see also Knake, supra note 3, at 32. 
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protected under the Constitution,300 and a strong argument can be made that the 
right to medical autonomy is protected as well.301 A state interest that is merely 
protectionist or that attempts to preserve the status and dignity of the 
profession would likewise fall to the public interest in free and unfettered 
communication.302 
Sorrell also clarifies that “access to information” is a part of the protected 
speech interest.303 As the Court pointed out, “[a]n individual’s right to speak is 
implicated when information he or she possesses is subjected to ‘restraints on 
the way in which the information might be used’ or disseminated.”304 
Prohibiting attorneys and physicians from accepting employment with 
corporate entities that might provide legal services to the public certainly 
restricts those professionals’ ability to disseminate information and provide 
advice, and it similarly limits the public’s ability to access that information. 
Nevertheless, the Court made it clear that that “free and uninhibited speech” 
was constitutionally protected, even from paternalistic attempts to protect the 
public from potentially harmful knowledge.305 These factors, combined with 
Citizens United’s warning that “the Government may not suppress political 
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,”306 suggest that the 
Court should – at a minimum – inquire into the actual basis of state policies 
supporting the corporate practice doctrine, and not merely defer to a 
 
300 U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
301 England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 259 F.2d 626, 627 (5th Cir. 1958) (“[T]he 
State cannot deny to any individual the right to exercise a reasonable choice in the method 
of treatment of his ills.”); B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical 
Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 345 (2007) (“The issue 
of when governmental interests outweigh the individual right to protect one’s health through 
making autonomous medical treatment choices is one that is not easily resolved, but it is 
worthy of the sort of serious consideration it has not yet received.”). 
302 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 647-48 (1985) (“[A]lthough the State undoubtedly has a substantial interest in ensuring 
that its attorneys behave with dignity and decorum in the courtroom, we are unsure that the 
State’s desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in their communications with the public is 
an interest substantial enough to justify the abridgment of their First Amendment rights.”). 
303 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665 (“An individual’s right to speak is implicated when 
information he or she possesses is subjected to ‘restraints on the way in which the 
information might be used’ or disseminated.” (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 
U.S. 20, 32 (1984))). 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 2671. 
306 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“We return to 
the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress 
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental 
interest justifies limits on the political speech of non-profit or for-profit corporations.”). 
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hypothetical wish for “independent” professionals – especially when that 
independence restricts access without improving quality.307 
Some scholars have concluded that Sorrell may portend a significant change 
in the Supreme Court’s scrutiny of economic liberties.308 In particular, 
Professor Tamara Piety has criticized the Court for “t[aking] a doctrine that 
was conceived of as a species of consumer protection, and justified as 
furthering the public interest, and turn[ing] it into a weapon against Vermont’s 
effort to protect consumers and the public health, safety, and welfare,” and has 
suggested that the case may signal a change in course for the future.309 
Similarly, others have criticized the Court’s underlying premise that consumers 
benefit from a robust commercial speech environment; if that premise is not 
accepted, then commercial speech limitations may be an important part of 
consumer protection.310 One possible limiting factor, however, is whether there 
is in fact evidence that the challenged regulation is counterproductive to the 
state’s articulated policy.311 Twenty years ago, the Seventh Circuit resisted a 
constitutional challenge to corporate practice restrictions in law, concluding 
that improving the quality of legal services was a rational state goal and that 
there was no evidence “laypersons will be deprived of meaningful access to the 
 
307 See supra Parts II & III. 
308 Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. 
IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 53-54 (2012) (arguing that the speaker-centric corporate 
personhood recognized in Citizens United was “imported” into the commercial speech 
doctrine by the Court in Sorrell “without explicitly overruling Central Hudson or 
acknowledging that it was announcing a new standard by which to evaluate commercial 
speech”); see also Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech or 
Resurrecting Lochner?, 2010-2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 135 (“If heightened scrutiny is 
to be applied to any commercial speech regulation that is based on the content of the speech 
being regulated, one could reasonably conclude that all such regulations will be subject to 
heightened scrutiny.”). 
309 Piety, supra note 308, at 53 (“[T]he Court rendered the commercial speech doctrine 
incoherent and sowed further confusion about what the appropriate test is. Armed with this 
new (and inherently contradictory) ‘content-neutrality’ inquiry, the Supreme Court is in a 
position to pick and choose and selectively invalidate those parts of the regulation of 
commerce brought to it with which its majority disagrees.”). 
310 See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 7-8 (“Citizens must be capable of making determinations that are both sophisticated 
and intricately rational if they are to separate truth from falsehood. On the whole, current 
and historical trends have not vindicated the market model’s faith in the rationality of the 
human mind, yet this faith stands as a foundation block for most recent free speech theory.” 
(citations omitted)). 
311 Essentially, this would require using the Castille court’s “evidence of irrationality” 
standard to negate state interests only when the asserted interests infringe on speech and 
communication rights. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223, cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 423 (2013) (“[A]lthough rational basis review places no affirmative evidentiary burden 
on the government, plaintiffs may nonetheless negate a seemingly plausible basis for the law 
by adducing evidence of irrationality.”). 
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courts if lawyers are unable to form partnerships with laypersons.”312 Now, 
however, the evidence is much clearer that corporate practice restrictions do 
not improve the quality of care, but do in fact reduce access to professional 
services.313 Given the Supreme Court’s increasing recognition of a public 
interest in free and unfettered commercial speech, it should allow courts to 
consider this evidence in assessing the constitutionality of corporate practice 
restrictions. 
It is difficult to predict how, or whether, the Court’s recent cases will be 
extended, and whether they will be used, as critics worry, to counteract state 
regulation in general. Nevertheless, at least as far as a corporate practice 
doctrine goes, the Court’s shift may suggest a reversion to the mean rather than 
a step away from the center. As discussed previously, the Court’s extreme 
deference to even hypothetical bases for state regulation of professional 
services stands as a barrier to effective and affordable legal counsel and 
medical care. Applying the more rigorous analysis of Sorrell and Citizens 
United would, at a minimum, require an evidence-based justification for the 
state’s restrictions on outside investment; it would no longer allow that interest 
to remain vaguely stated and merely hypothetical. Once the hypothetical 
justification is removed, however, it becomes apparent that there is no 
evidence that corporate investment in professional services reduces quality or 
infringes on independence; on the contrary, the evidence suggests that 
loosening these restrictions would increase access to services without 
diminishing quality. Unless and until proponents of the corporate practice 
restrictions can articulate an actual threat to professional judgment or quality of 
care, the prohibitions should be struck down. 
CONCLUSION 
By prohibiting professionals from freely contracting for corporate 
employment and from obtaining outside investment, the corporate practice 
doctrine distorts the market for professional services. In particular, the doctrine 
causes difficulties at the low end of the market, limiting middle-income 
individuals’ access to the market for professional service. Without this 
restriction, corporations and outside investors could offer capital infusions that 
would allow professional service providers to achieve economies of scale, 
making it more affordable to serve a middle class market.314 Without such a 
 
312 Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1387 (7th Cir. 1992); id. at 1385 (“Unless 
a governmental regulation draws a suspect classification or infringes on a fundamental right, 
the government need only show that its regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest. . . . [T]he two rules in question meet this test because they are designed to 
safeguard the public, maintain the integrity of the profession, and protect the administration 
of justice from reproach.”). 
313 See supra Parts II & III. 
314 See supra Part II; see also RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 66 (1998) (explaining that with freedom of contract, “rights to use 
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right, however, individuals’ access to the market for professional services 
remains difficult; willing service providers lack the administrative ability and 
financial cushion needed to connect with willing clients, even in cases where 
the transaction would be beneficial to both parties.315 Political efforts to relax 
the corporate practice restrictions have generally failed.316 Although few 
onlookers defend corporate practice restrictions in theory, insiders – 
established professionals who see corporate investment as a competitive threat 
– have worked hard to defeat proposals that would open the professions to 
outside investment. 
The time is now ripe for a challenge to corporate practice restrictions in both 
medicine and law. First, there is affirmative evidence in the medical field that 
loosening corporate restrictions does not reduce the quality of care.317 Second, 
and more importantly, it is becoming clear that the perfect is the enemy of the 
good when it comes to access to professional services. In theory, the corporate 
practice doctrine tries to insulate the public from bad advice by requiring that 
physicians, attorneys, and other professionals remain economically 
independent. In actuality, however, the public is not – and cannot be – 
insulated at all; the information previously available only to licensed 
professionals is now easily found on the internet,318 and professionals licensed 
in other countries are both able and willing to provide their services to U.S. 
clients.319 
Evidence that the corporate practice doctrine restricts access to professional 
care without improving its quality is significant, because the Supreme Court 
appears to be moving toward a more evidence-based evaluation of legislative 
action – especially in cases where that legislative action restricts speech. In 
evaluating corporate practice restrictions, the Court may therefore require 
something more than a mere hypothetical state interest to support the 
restriction, regardless of whether it applies a contextual rational basis standard 
“with bite” or whether it applies a more heightened level of scrutiny.320 Under 
either standard, the Court should not merely accept the assertion that the public 
could theoretically benefit from requiring professionals to remain 
economically independent. The costs to access and affordability are too great, 
and the public interest in communication too strong, to accept protectionist 
impulses that have only a vague possibility of improved quality of care in the 
professional realm. If proponents of the restrictions cannot show an actual – as 
opposed to a hypothetical – public benefit, then the corporate practice 
restrictions should fall. 
 
resources are permitted to flow to those who believe they know best how to use them”). 
315 See supra Part II. 
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